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Abstract 
This thesis studies the application of deterministic chaos to digital 
cryptography. Cryptographic systems such as pseudo-random generat-
ors (PRNG), block ciphers and hash functions are regarded as a dy-
namic system (X, j), where X is a state space (Le. message space) 
and f : X -+ X is an iterated function. In both chaos theory and 
cryptography, the object of study is a dynamic system that performs 
an iterative nonlinear transformation of information in an apparently 
unpredictable but deterministic manner. In terms of chaos theory, the 
sensitivity to the initial conditions together with the mixing property 
ensures cryptographic confusion (statistical independence) and diffusion 
(uniform propagation of plaintext and key randomness into cihertext). 
This synergetic relationship between the properties of chaotic and 
cryptographic systems is considered at both the theoretical and prac-
tical levels: The theoretical background upon which this relationship is 
based, includes discussions on chaos, ergodicity, complexity, randomness, 
unpredictability and entropy. 
Two approaches to the finite-state implementation of chaotic systems 
(Le. pseudo-chaos) are considered: (i) floating-point approximation of 
continuous-state chaos; (ii) binary pseudo-chaos. An overview is given 
of chaotic systems underpinning cryptographic algorithms along with 
their strengths and weaknesses. Though all conventional cryposystems 
are considered binary pseudo-chaos, neither chaos, nor pseudo-chaos are 
sufficient to guarantee cryptographic strength and security. 
A dynamic system is said to have an analytical solution Xn = <I>(xo) 
1 
if any trajectory point Xn can be computed directly from the initial 
conditions Xo, without performing n iterations. A chaotic system with an 
analytical solution may have a unpredictable multi-valued map Xn+l = 
f(xn). Their floating-point approximation is studied in the context of 
pseudo-random generators. 
A cryptographic software system E-Larm ™ implementing a multi-
stream pseudo-chaotic generator is described. Several pseudo-chaotic 
systems including the logistic map, sine map, tangent- and logarithm-
feedback maps, sawteeth and tent maps are evaluated by means of floating-
point computations. Two types of partitioning are used to extract 
pseudo-random from the floating-point state variable: (i) combining the 
last significant bits of the floating-point number (for nonlinear maps); 
and (ii) threshold partitioning (for piecewise linear maps). Multi-round 
iterations are produced to decrease the bit dependence and increase non-
linearity. Relationships between pseudo-chaotic systems are introduced 
to avoid short cycles (each system influences periodically the states of 
other systems used in the encryption session). 
An evaluation of cryptographic properties of E-Larm is given using 
graphical plots such as state distributions, phase-space portraits, spectral 
density Fourier transform, approximated entropy (APEN), cycle length 
histogram, as well as a variety of statistical tests from the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) suite. Though E-Larm passes 
all tests recommended by NIST, an approach based on the floating-point 
approximation of chaos is inefficient in terms of the quality/performance 
ratio (compared with existing PRNG algorithms). Also no solution is 
known to control short cycles. 
In conclusion, the role of chaos theory in cryptography is identified; 
disadvantages of floating-point pseudo-chaos are emphasized although 
binary pseudo-chaos is considered useful for cryptographic applications. 
Keywords: chaos, cryptography, synergics, pseudo-chaos, random-
ness, complexity, unpredictability. 
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Notation 
x 
f 
Xo 
p 
r 
s 
K(a) 
c(a) 
C(xoY 
Pr(a) 
Pr(alm 
Hn 
hn = hn+1ln 
h,hsh 
hKS 
state space 
subsets of X 
iterated function 
initial condition 
parameter of an iterated function 
composition of n iterations of f 
system state after n iterations, i.e. Xn = r(xo) 
trajectory starting at Xo 
analytical (exact) solution of a dynamic system 
symbol 
n-symbol string 
algorithmic (Kolomogorov) complexity of a 
symbolic complexity of a 
complexity of trajectory staring at Xo 
probability of occurrence of a 
probability of a provided f3 has been obtained 
entropy of an 
conditional entropy of (n + l)-th symbol in an 
entropy of the source (generator) 
Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy 
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Glossary of Terms 
Cryptography 
PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator 
LFSR Linear Feedback Shift Register 
NFSR Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register 
LCG Linear Congruent Generator 
SHAIG Secure Hash Algorithm 1 Generator 
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PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
Mathematics & Chaos Theory 
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KS Kolmogorov-Sinai (entropy) 
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FFT Fast Fourier Transform 
Complexity Theory 
P Polynomial-time Computations 
NP Nondeterministic Polynomial Time Computations 
BPP Bounded-away-error Probabilistic Polynomial Time Computations 
Computer Science 
CA Cellular Automata 
FPA Floating-point Arithmetic 
BA Binary Arithmetic 
CPU Central Processing 
NaN Not-a-Number (infinity or incomputable value) 
Organizations and Standards 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technologies 
IEEE Institute of Electronic and Electrical Engineers 
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 The Information Society 
Our digital age has brought about a number of changes in society but perhaps the 
most profound is the impact it has had upon basic human activities such as decision 
making, information processing and communications which are all supported by 
computer devices. 
The information revolution can be compared in its impact to that of the industrial 
revolution of the nineteenth century. The value of information has changed in that 
both the constructive and destructive powers of information flow are very different 
compared with the situation less than a hundred years ago. In the commercial sector, 
'know how' contributes considerably to company market value because information 
provides a primary competitive advantage. Clearly, critical information is vital for 
national security and financial organizations. Accurate knowledge of public opinion 
allows political leaders to react rapidly in their policies or programs. Thus, political 
power is now critically dependent on the flow of information. 
Organisations in both the public and private sectors have become increasingly de-
pendent on electronic data processing. Vast amounts of digital data are now gathered 
and stored in large computer data bases and transmitted between computers and 
terminal devices linked together in complex communications networks. Without ap-
propriate safeguards, these data are susceptible to interception during transmission, 
or they may be physically removed or copied while in storage. This could result in 
14 
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unwanted exposures of data and potential invasions of privacy. Data are also sus-
ceptible to unauthorised deletion, modification, or addition during transmission or 
storage. This can result in illicit access to computing resources and services, falsific-
ation of personal data or business records, or the conduct of fraudulent transactions, 
including increases in credit authorisations, modification of funds transfers, and the 
issue of unauthorised payments. 
The speed of information flow has developed considerably over the past ten 
years. As with high speed vehicles, skilled control becomes increasingly important 
as information flow increases in the rapidity of its exchange; the web being an 
environment in which information flow is now very difficult to control effectively. 
Access to the global market is a key incentive in society. New economic in-
centives require new services based on electronic and mobile transactions and both 
individuals and industries will require involvement under conditions that are not 
only financially advantageous but secure. The continuous update of security infra-
structures is absolutely necessary to encourage the further development of the new 
global economy. 
Modern information security manifests itself in many ways according to the 
situation and requirement. It deals with such concepts as confidentiality, data in-
tegrity, access control, identification, authentication and authorization. Practical 
applications, closely related to information security, are private messaging, financial 
transactions, online services and many others. 
Legislators, recognizing that the importance of information security, have passed 
laws to help prevent these problems. But laws alone cannot prevent attacks or 
eliminate threats to data processing systems. Additional steps must be taken to 
preserve the secrecy and integrity of computer data. Among the security measures 
that should be considered is cryptography, which embraces methods for rendering 
data unintelligible to unauthorised parties. 
1.2 Cryptography, Cryptanalysis and Cryptology 
The word is derived from the Greek kryptos, meaning 'hidden', and graphein meaning 
'to write'. Cryptography concerns the ways in which communications and data can 
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be encoded to prevent disclosure of their contents through eavesdropping or message 
interception, using codes, cyphers, and other methods. 
From ancient civilisations, with Julius Caesar, Abraham Lincoln and Iosif Stalin 
cryptography has been a part of history. During the World War II, the Germans 
developed the Enigma machine to have secure communications. Enigma codes were 
decrypted first in Poland in the late 1930s and then under the secret 'Ultra Project' 
based at Bletchly Park in Buckinghamshire (UK) during the early 1940s. This led 
to a substantial reduction in the level of allied shipping sunk by German U-boats 
and together the invention of Radar was arguably one of the most important contri-
butions that electronics made to the war effort. In addition, this work contributed 
significantly to the development of electronic computing after 1945. 
Cryptography has always been shrouded in secrecy itself and remains one of the 
most secret sciences in the world. Professional cryptographers working for intelli-
gence services and commercial organizations have been limited in their publications. 
As a result, the freely available literature never fully reflects the state of the art. 
Nations vary in their reticence: whereas the United States released quite generous 
information on the situation in the Second World War, the Soviet Union clocked 
itself in silence; but all the time scientists from both countries kept abreast of each 
other. Claude Shannon, an American electrical engineer, formulated the major cri-
teria and fundamental of cryptographic techniques in his secret report of 1945 that 
was unclassified in 1949 and published as Communication theory of secrecy systems 
[92J. Vladimir Alexandrovich Kotelnikov, a founder of Russian cryptography, in 
1941 formulated the requirements to a perfect encryption system and mathemat-
ically proved its cryptographic resistance. This work together with the Kotelnikov 
theorem (the sampling theorem) became the foundation of Russian cryptography 
and provided secure communication during World War II in 1942-1945. 
Since that time, cryptography has absorbed ideas from complexity theory, num-
ber theory, group theory, combinatory logic and modern computer science and grown 
from basic symmetric ciphers to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and complex 
cryptosystems. In particular, in 1976 asymmetric public keys was first proposed 
in a revolutionary article by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [39J. 
A century ago, one could say that cryptography is the science (or art) of secret 
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writing and reading, which has grown from semiotics, the study of signs and sign-
using behavior!, rather than mathematics. 
Today cryptography is, essentially, the study of mathematical and computational 
techniques underlying information security. Cryptography is closely connected to 
the disciplines of cryptanalysis and cryptology. In simple terms, cryptanalysis is the 
art of breaking cryptosystems, i.e. retrieving the original message without knowing 
the proper key or forging an electronic signature. Cryptology is the mathematics, 
such a number theory, which underpin cryptography and cryptanalysis. 
Cryptography is the only known practical method for protecting information 
transmitted through communications networks that uses land lines, communica-
tions satellites, and microwave facilities. In some instances, it can be the most 
economical way to protect stored data. Cryptographic procedures can also be used 
for message authentication, digital signatures and personal identification for author-
ising electronic funds transfer and credit card transactions. 
1.3 The Synergetic Approach to Cryptography 
In making innovations, we typically take existing models from one science and trans-
plant them into a new subject area. For example, it is quite natural to apply models 
from nonlinear dynamics (chaos theory) for the purpose of encryption. If we are suc-
cessful, a new cryptographic algorithm will emerge. This is a practical benefit of a 
cross-disci plinary approach (Figure 1.1). 
Unlike most new disciplines that appear at the edge, of existing sciences when a 
model or a technique from one subject area is applied in another, synergetics studies 
common fundamentals of these sciences, extending the global collection of ideas and 
methods [2]. 
The term synergetics (from Greek: synergeia - working together, cooperation) 
was introduced by the German physicist Haken in the beginning of 70's. Haken's 
1 Although the word was used in this sense in the 17th century by the English philosopher John 
Locke, the idea of semiotics as an interdisciplinary mode for examining phenomena in different 
fields emerged only in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
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Figure 1.1: The cross-disciplinary approach to cryptography 
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synergetics treats systems in which cooperation among subsystems creates organ-
ized structure on macroscopic scales [54]. Synergetics aims to understand common 
laws driving processes in different nonlinear systems with a feedback. Examples of 
problems studied by synergetics are bifurcations, phase transitions in physics, non-
linear oscillations in electrical circuits, population dynamics. From a certain view 
point, a similiar definition is given by the American scientist R. Buckminster Fuller: 
"Synergy means behavior of whole systems unpredicted by the behavior of their parts 
taken separatel'!J' [47] . One can see this property in cryptographic systems, whose 
strength depends on the integrity of several mathematical constructions . 
Today, it would not be easy to find a discipline remaining untouched by syn-
ergetics and deterministic chaos. These new sciences have transfused all the scope 
of human knowledge: not only mathematics, physics, biology, economics, digital 
imaging, simulation sciences [20, 6, 18, 4, 16], but also many human studies such 
as history and sociology [1, 20]. Cryptography, of course, was not an exception 
- a number of scientists have relatively evaluated encryption techniques based on 
nonlinear dynamic systems (for example, [76 , 53, 69, 45, 63]). 
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1.4 Deterministic Chaos 
The word chaos appeared in early Greek cosmology and denoted either the primeval 
emptiness of the universe before things came into being or the abyss of Tartarus, 
the underworld. Both concepts occur in the Theogony of Hesiod2 . First there was 
Chaos in Hesiod's system, then Gaea and Eros (Earth and Desire). This concept 
tied in with the other early notion that saw in Chaos the darkness of the underworld. 
In later cosmologies, chaos generally described the original state of things irre-
spective of their conception. The modern meaning of the word is derived from Ovid, 
who saw chaos as the original disordered and formless mass from which the maker 
of the Cosmos produced the ordered universe. 
Today (deterministic) chaos theory, considered as one of the most important 
sciences of the last few decades, has absorbed ideas and methods from pure math-
ematics, dynamical systems theory, symbolic dynamics, non-equilibrium thermo-
dynamics and fractal geometry. Compared with Greek cosmology, it denotes the 
opposite properties of chaos: self-organization, order, bounded space and determin-
ism. However, both meanings of the word assume the unpredictability. 
The idea that many simple nonlinear deterministic systems can behave in an 
apparently unpredictable and chaotic manner was first observed by the great French 
mathematician Henri Poincare. Other early pioneering works in the field of chaot ic 
dynamics are to be found in the mathematical literature by such luminaries as 
Birkhoff, Cartwright, Littlewood, Levinson, Smale, Kolmogorov and his students . 
The key feature of chaotic behavior in different systems is mainly related to the 
high sensitivity to initial conditions due to exponential divergence of all trajectories 
lying on the attracting structure which is normally bounded in an appropriate phase 
space. In the 1960's Edward Lorenz, an American meteorologist, discovered a stable 
chaotic attractor and predicted that: " ... it may happen that small differences in 
the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena. A small error 
in the form er will produce an enormous error in the future. Prediction becomes 
impossible . .. " 
The Nobel laureate Ilia Prigogine, a Russian-born Belgian physical chemist , is 
2Hesiod, 700 Be, one of the earliest Greek poets. His epic Theogony describes the myths of the 
gods. 
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Figure 1.2: Self-organization of the nature 
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ROLL IT 
Figure 1.3: Production of pastry dough [23] 
one of the founders of chaos theory. His research in nonlinear dissipative structures 
led to the concept of equilibrium and non-equilibrium conditions to categorize the 
state of a system. In the physical studies of thermodynamics, Prigogines' research re-
vealed non-equilibrium conditions that led to systemic behavior different from what 
was expected by the customary interpretation of the second law of thermodynamics. 
The phenomena of bifurcation and self-organization emerged from systems in equi-
librium as if there was disruption or interference. This disruption or interference 
became the next step in chaos theory; it became chaos/complexity theory. 
Mathematical or deterministic chaos is a dynamic system, characterized with a 
'complex' and 'unpredictable' behavior. Intuitively, this property suits the require-
ments of a digital encryption system - on the one hand computer-based cryptosys-
terns are deterministic; on the other, they must be cryptographically unpredictable. 
Practically, the last property implies that given certain information on the cipher-
text and the plaintext (the message), a cryptanalyst should not be able to predict 
the cryptographic transformation and recover the key or the message. 
1.5 History of Chaos-based Cryptography 
In his classical paper Claude Shannon explicitly mentioned the basic stretch-and-
fold mechanism of chaos for the purpose of encryption (Figure 1.3): "Good mixing 
transformations are often formed by repeated products of two simple noncommuting 
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operations. Hopf 3 has shown, for example, that pastry dough can be mixed by such 
a sequence of operations. The dough is first rolled out into a thin slab, then folded 
over, then rolled, and then folded again, etc . .. " [92]. In spite of this, the importance 
of chaos-based cryptography had not been fully appreciated till the end of 1980's 
when digital computers became widely available for chaos simulations and the role 
of cryptography increased considerably. 
Many papers (e.g. [67,33,3,36,104,93,7]) discussed encryption schemes based 
on synchronized chaotic circuits. However, these analog schemes belong more to the 
field of steganography and secure radio communication, and lie beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
Cryptography attracted scientists from many areas and they started exploiting 
different dynamic systems for the purpose of encryption. Most of these systems were 
defined on real numbers, so floating-point arithmetic was used to approximate chaos 
on a finite-state machine (digital computer) [41,59, 76, 25, 53, 82, 49, 22, 103,69]. 
Discrete (binary) chaotic systems [97] such as the cellular automata [102 , 52]' 
discrete Baker transformation [89, 45], discrete tent map [75] and discrete affine 
transformation [84] provided more efficient encryption schemes. 
Since 2000, the potential of chaos-based communication, especially spread spec-
trum modulation, has been recognized worldwide. For instance, the book Chaotic 
electronics in telecommunications by Kennedy et al. [63] described chaotic modu-
lations and suggested their electronic implementations. Again, the emphasis here 
is put on information coding rather then digital encryption, which is the subject of 
this research. 
Finally, inspiration for this work came from my supervisor J. M. Blackledge [26], 
L. Kocarev [66], Z. Kotulski and J. Szczepanski [68, 95]. 
3Hopf, Eberhard F . F , (1902- 1983) , an Austrian mathematician who made significant contri-
butions in topology and ergodic theory, studied 'pastry dough mixing' in compact spaces [On 
causality, statistics and probability, Journal of Mathematics and Physics, 13, pp. 51- 102, 1934] 
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1.6 Original Contribution 
This thesis discusses the theoretical background and practical implementations of 
chaos-based cryptosystems known at the present moment . Additionally, the follow-
ing results are considered useful and unique: 
• Floating-point approximations of various chaotic systems (i. e. pseudo-chaos) 
are studied in deep using different types of partit ioning methods and statistical 
tests . 
• Known cryptographic techniques using chaos have been combined and exten-
ded into an original system E-Larm. In particular, 
multiple nonlinear chaotic systems are used together to increase the reli-
ability and complexity of the generator; 
ii a mixing component is used to provide a relationship between different 
chaotic systems and increase the average cycle length of the generator in 
general; 
iii the minimal bound of the iteration counter (discrete time) is used to 
improve the pseudo-random appearance of the output ; whereas the upper 
bound is used to avoid very short orbits; 
iv optimal values for algorithm parameters are derived and implemented . 
• An evaluation of the E-Larm system is given using a test methodology based 
on NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technologies) recommendations . 
• Conclusions are made about the general role of chaos theory in cryptography. 
Chapter 2 
Preliminaries 
This chapter assembles the mathematical concepts from cryptography [90, 77] and 
nonlinear dynamics [81, 11, 12, 9, 4, 31, 79], emphasizing their common fundament-
als. 
2.1 Cryptography 
2.1.1 What is Digital Information? 
With regard to information in a computer environment we assume an array of bits or 
binary strings that carry a text message or any multimedia object such as an image 
and sound. A binary string to be transmitted or kept confidential in a storage is 
called plaintext. We denote the plaintext as 
where P is a finite alphabet of plaintext symbols. In digital cryptosystems, the 
alphabet is binary, that is P = Z2 = {O, I}. We can also consider the alphabet of 
bytes (P = Z256 = {O, 1}8) or larger data blocks. 
Let C = {Cl, C2, ... , Ci, ... , Cn I Ci E C} denote the encrypted message or the cipher-
text. The alphabet C can differ from P, in most cases, P = C = {O, l}m. 
24 
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x 
Figure 2.1: An iterative cryptosystem 
2.1.2 Cryptographic System 
In a broad sense, a cryptographic system is the whole computer infrastructure 
providing information security, i.e. a balanced software and hardware solution im-
plementing cryptographic algorithms (encryption/decryption, authentication, key 
management etc) . In the real world a cryptographic system crucially depends on 
humans. 
In a narrow sense, a cryptographic system is a mathematical construction that 
transforms information to make it inaccessible for an adversary. A cryptosystem 
can be considered as a dynamic system (Section 2.2.1) 
S = (X , f: X x K -t X) , (2 .1) 
where the set X is a state space and the function f is a cryptographic transformation 
depending on a key from K. The system state x E X encodes certain information, for 
example, a plaintext or a signature (in most ciphers, X = P = C). Other examples 
of cryptographic systems are a pseudo-random generator and hash functions. The 
function f is given by a deterministic algorithm, which can be implemented on a 
Turing machine. 
Often, a cryptosystem is defined by a nonlinear iterative transformation with a 
feedback (Figure 2.1). The system produces a sequence of states xo , Xl, ... ,Xn , . .. , 
where Xn = f (Xn-l, k) = r (xo, k), Xo E X, k E IC. The initial condition Xo is an 
input message, and the final state Xn is an output message. The sequence {xn } is 
called a trajectory or an orbit. Since f is deterministic, the whole trajectory is given 
by the init ial condition Xo and the (secret) parameter k. 
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Figure 2.2: A secure communication scheme using encryption and decryption. 
So far, any conventional cryptographic system can be considered as a determin-
istic dynamic system (J, X, K) with a nonlinear iterated function J, a state space 
X and a key space K. In general, the basic requirements for a cryptosystem are 
unpredictability and random-like behavior. 
2.1.3 Encryption and Decryption 
Encryption is a transformation E : p. x E -7 C·, where C is a ciphertext alphabet, 
and E is an encryption key space. Hence, 
c = E (p, e) = Ee(P), pEP, c E C, e E E. 
Decryption is the inverse transformation D : C· x V -7 p., where V is a decryption 
key space, i. e. 
p = D(c,d) = Dd(C), p E P, c E C,d E V. 
Usually, E = V = K = {O, l}m. 
Figure 2.2 gives a classical communication scheme using encryption and decryp-
tion. 
Definition 1 Encryption scheme or cipher is a system 
S=(E,D,P, C,K), 
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where E : p. x K --t C· and D : C· x K --t p. , such as for each e E K exists a 
unique key d E K and Dd = E; l, i. e. 
Vp E P ,e E K, 3d E K : p = D(E(p,e) ,d). 
Practically, a cipher is given by two algorithms E, D and sets P, C and K . 
Symmetric and Asymmetric Ciphers 
There are two classes of key-based encryption algorithms, symmetric (or private 
key) and asymmetric (or public key) algorithms. The difference is that symmetric 
algorithms use the same key for encryption and decryption ( e = d, or the decryption 
key is easily derived from the encryption key), whereas asymmetric algorithms use a 
different key for encryption and decryption (e i- d), and the decryption key cannot 
be derived from the encryption key. 
Asymmetric ciphers (also called public-key algorithms or generally public-key 
cryptography) permit the encryption key to be public (it can even be published in 
a newspaper), allowing anyone to encrypt with the key, whereas only the proper 
recipient (who knows the decryption key) can decrypt the message. The encryption 
key is also called the public key and the decryption key the private or secret key. 
A well known example of asymmetric cipher is cryptographic system developed in 
1977 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) in the US [87]. Pretty Good Privacy 
(PGP), an encryption software written by Philip R. Zimmerman, is an other example 
of public key cryptography [106]. 
This paper focuses on symmetric ciphers. 
Substitution and Transposition Ciphers 
Before the development of digital computers, cryptography consisted of character-
based algorithms. Different cryptographic algorithms either substituted characters 
for one another or transposed characters with one another. The better algorithms 
did both, many times each. 
Although the technology for developing cypher systems is more complex now, 
the underlying philosophy remains the same. The primary change is that algorithms 
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work on bits instead of characters. This is actually just a change in the alphabet 
size- from 26 elements to 2256 elements in modern block ciphers. 
Substitution Cyphers As their name suggests, these preserve the order of the 
plaintext symbols, but disguise them. Each letter or group of letters is replaced 
by another letter or group to disguise it. In its simplest form, 'a' becomes 'D', 
'b' becomes 'E', 'c' becomes 'F' etc. 
More complex substitutions can be devised, e.g. a random (or key controlled) 
mapping of one letter to another. This general system is called a monoal-
phabetic substitution. They are relatively easy to decode if the statistical 
properties of natural languages are used. For example, in English, 'e' is the 
most common letter followed by 't', then 'a' etc. 
The cryptanalyst would count the relative occurrences of the letter in the 
cyphertext, or look for a word that would be expected in the message. To 
make the encryption more secure, a polyalphabetic cypher may be used, in 
which a matrix of alphabets is employed to smooth out the frequencies of the 
cyphertext letters. 
It is in fact possible to construct an unbreakable cypher if the key is longer than 
the plaintext, although this method, known as a 'one time pad' has practical 
disadvantages. 
Transposition Cyphers A common example, the 'column transposition cypher' 
is shown in Table 2.1 Here the plaintext is: 'This is an example of a simple 
transposition cypher'. The cyphertext is: 'almniefheolpnatnepsorimsripdspia-
thesaatsicixfeoc b' 
The plaintext is ordered in rows under the key which numbers the columns so 
formed. Column 1 in the example is under the key letter closest to the start 
of the alphabet. The cyphertext is then read out by columns, starting with 
the column whose number is the lowest . 
To break such a cypher, the cryptanalyst must guess the length of the keyword, 
and order of the columns. 
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K E Y W 0 R D 
3 2 7 6 4 5 1 
t h s s a 
n e x a m p 
e 0 f a s m 
p e t r a n 
s p 0 s t 
0 n c p h e 
r a b c d e f 
Table 2. 1: Example of Transposition Cypher 
Block and Stream Ciphers 
Encryption algorithms can also be divided into stream ciphers and block ciphers. 
Stream ciphers (also known as state ciphers) encrypt a single bit or block of plaintext 
at a time and the encryption depends on time (i .e. cipher state); identical plaintext 
blocks are transformed into different ciphertext blocks. Block ciphers take a larger 
block of bits and encrypt them as independent units; identical plaintext blocks 
correspond to identical ciphertext blocks . For example, the transposition cipher is 
a typical block encryption scheme. 
A stream or block cipher can be considered as a nonlinear dynamic system (2.1). 
T he role of trajectory in each class of ciphers is explained below: 
1. A block cipher performs n iterations with an invertible funct ion f (Figure 2.3) . 
T he number n is fixed and relatively small (often, n = 16). Each iteration 
transfers the system into the next state, i. e. Xi+l = f (Xi). The plaintext is 
assign to the initial condition (xo = p), and the ciphertext is obtained from 
the final state (c = xn) . The intermediate states (Xl, .. . ,Xn-l) are hidden 
from external observers. Symbolically, 
E(p, k) = r(p, k), 
D(c, k) = f-n(c, k). 
Modern block ciphers combine several dynamic systems by adding their states 
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N= const 
Xo=P 
o 16 t 
Figure 2.3: A trajectory of a block cipher. The block cipher iterates exactly N 
times. The plaintext p is assigned to the initial state. The ciphertext c is the final 
state . The key is determined by parameters of the iterated function (not shown on 
the diagram). 
(a) 
C,=X,+p, 
4----------------~ 
n 
(e) 
(b) 
;---------------~ 
c,=n,·n, c,=n,·n, c,=n,-n, n 
Figure 2.4: Trajectories of stream ciphers based on a single trajectory. (a) The 
ciphertext c is the plaintext p plus chaotic noise x (e.g. simple XOR cipher using 
chaos key stream suggested by Bianco, see Section 4.2.3); (b) The ciphertext c is a 
number of iterations n (Baptista, Section 4.2 .7) ; (c) The ciphertext c is the system 
state after p iterations (Gallagher, Section 4.2.7). 
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to each other, for example, in the American Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
developed at IBM or in its successor, the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES). 
2. Stream ciphers are more diverse from the view point of using the traject-
ory (Figure 2.4 a-c). The main difference from block ciphers is that all the 
ciphertext is 'cohered' with one or more trajectories and the encryption trans-
formation each block depends on the system state x. The trajectory length is 
not limited and depends on the message length. Chapter 4 provides example 
ciphers for each type a,b and c. Simplifying, we can write 
E(Pn' k) = g(r(xn, k),Pn), 
D(cn, k) = g-l(r(xn, k), cn) 
where g(x, Pn) and g-l (x, cn) are cryptographic functions that respectively 
encrypts and decrypts the input symbol using a current state x as the key. 
Vernam Cipher 
The simplest stream encryption scheme is a Vernam cipher [77] . A Vernam cipher 
converts plaintext into ciphertext 1 bit a time. A key-stream generator outputs 
a stream of bits: kI, k2 , • .. ,kn . This key-stream (sometime called a running key) 
is XOR'ed with a stream of plaintext bits, P1,P2, ... ,Pn to produce the stream of 
cipher bits, i. e. 
To decrypt, the ciphertext bits are XOR'ed with an identical key-stream to recover 
the plaintext bits, i.e. 
Pi = Ci EEl ki' 
since Pi EEl ki EEl ki = Pi. 
Figure 2.4 (a) represents a similar encryption scheme. The trajectory corresponds 
to the key-stream. After each iteration Ci = Pi + Xi (for decryption Pi = Ci - Xi). 
If the key-stream k = {kd is truly random (has a truly uniform distribution) , 
the Vern am cipher is called one-time pad, which is perfectly secure. The concept of 
true randomness and perfect security is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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2.1.4 Pseudo-Random Number Generators 
In practical cryptography, one-time pads are not used since it is technically difficult 
to generate and distribute enormous truly random keys . Random pads are not 
reproducible. Pseudo-Random (Number) Generators (PRNG) extract a compact 
seed into a long sequence. The output pseudo-random sequences appear random, 
i. e. the probability distribution function cannot be efficiently distinguish from that 
of white noise. 
PRNG's playa central role in computer cryptography. Although they may be 
applied explicitly in stream ciphers, the main application is round key generation in 
block encryption schemes. 
According to our approach, we consider PRNG's as a nonlinear dynamic sys-
tem that differs from the conventional approach in which pseudo-random numbers 
are generated from mod-based iterations (e.g. Xn+ l = rXn mod q as illustrated in 
Section 3.6). Figure 2.1 represents a typical PRNG producing a sequence Xl, X2, . .• 
from the seed given by the initial condition Xo and parameter p. 
The critical requirements for dynamic systems to be used in cryptography are 
pseudo-randomness and unpredictability. Chapter 3 provides formal defini t ions of 
these properties and links them to concepts of chaotic dynamics. 
2.1.5 Confusion and Diffusion 
Using pseudo-random sequences, modern algorithms are far from the theoretical 
perfection and thus retain some information about the plaintext in the ciphertext. 
Roughly speaking, the randomness or unpredictability of the seed is spread through 
the whole pseudo-random sequence. An amount of plaintext redundancy is still in-
variant after encryption (kept in the ciphertext), which makes possible both known-
plaintext and ciphertext-only attacks. To avoid this (at least to some degree), the 
plaintext should be reduced as close as possible to its true entropy by means of a 
good compression algorithm. If ideal compression could be achieved, then changing 
any number of bits in the compressed message would result in another sensible mes-
sage when un compressed (see also Section 3.2.3). Otherwise, two basic techniques 
for hiding redundancies in ciphertext should be used (Shannon , [92]) : 
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Confusion 
Confusion ensures that the (statistical) properties of plaintext blocks are not 
reflected in the corresponding ciphertext blocks. Instead every ciphertext must 
have a pseudo-random appearance to any observer or standard statistical test. 
Diffusion 
In terms of plain texts, diffusion demands that (statistically) similar plaintexts 
do result in completely different cipher texts even when encrypted with the 
same key. In particular, this requires that any element of the input block 
influences every element of the output block in a complex irregular fashion. 
In terms of a key, diffusion demands that similar keys do result in completely 
different ciphertexts even when used for encrypting the same block of plaintext. 
This requires that any element of the key influences every element of the output 
block in a complex irregular fashion. Additionally, this property must also be 
valid for the decryption process because otherwise an intruder might recover 
parts of the input block from an observed output by a partly correct guess of 
the key used for encryption. 
Most block ciphers explicitly implement confusion and diffusion: respectively, 
their iterated function consists of substitution and permutation phases. Eventually, 
both phases taken together, ensure a highly nonlinear transformation resulting in a 
pseudo-random and unpredictable ciphertext. 
2.1.6 Cryptanalysis 
The whole point of cryptography is to keep the plaintext (or the key, or both) secret 
from eavesdroppers (also called adversaries, attackers, interceptors, interlopers, in-
truders, opponents, or simply the enemy). Eavesdroppers are assumed to have 
complete access to the communication between the sender and receiver. 
Cryptanalysis is the science of recovering the plaintext of a message without 
access to the key. Successful cryptanalysis may recover the plaintext or the key. It 
also may find weaknesses in a cryptographic system that eventually leads to recovery 
of the plaintext or key. (The loss of a key though non-cryptanalytic means is called 
a compromise.) 
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A fundamental assumption in cryptanalysis (first enunciated by the Dutchman A 
Kerckhoff) assumes that the cryptanalyst has complete details of the cryptographic 
algorithm and implementation. Some old cryptographic systems rely on the secrecy 
of the algorithms; such algorithms are only of historical interest and are not adequate 
for real-world needs. All modern algorithms use a key to control encryption and 
decryption ("The enemy knows the system being used" as stated by Shannon); a 
message can be decrypted only if the key matches the encryption key. 
An attempted cryptanalysis is called an attack. There a four principal types 
of cryptanalytic attacks; each of them assumes that the cryptanalyst has complete 
knowledge of the encryption algorithm used: 
Cyphertext-only attack The cryptanalyst has the cyphertext of several mes-
sages, all of which have been encrypted using the same encryption algorithm. 
The cryptanalyst's job is to recover the plaintext of as many messages as pos-
sible, or to deduce the key (or keys) used to encrypt the messages, in order to 
decrypt other messages encrypted with the same keys. 
Known-plaintext attack The cryptanalyst not only has access to the cyphertext 
of several messages, but also to the plaintext of those messages. The problem 
is to deduce the key (or keys) used to encrypt the messages or an algorithm 
to decrypt any new messages encrypted with the same key (or keys). 
Chosen-plaintext attack The cryptanalyst not only has access to the cyphertext 
and associated plaintext for several messages, but also chooses the plaintext 
that gets encrypted. This is more powerful than a known-plaintext attack , 
because the cryptanalyst can choose specific plaintext blocks to encrypt those 
that might yield more information about the key. The problem is to deduce 
the key (or keys) used to encrypt the messages or an algorithm to decrypt any 
new messages encrypted with the same key (or keys). 
Adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack This is a special case of a chosen-plaintext 
attack. Not only can the cryptanalyst choose the plaintext that is encrypted, 
but can also modify the choice based on the results of previous encryption. In 
a chosen-plaintext attack, a cryptanalyst might just be able to choose one large 
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block of plaintext to be encrypted; in an adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack it is 
possible to choose a smaller block of plaintext and then choose another based 
on the results of the first, and so on. 
In addition to the above, there are at least three other types of cryptanalytic attack. 
Chosen-cyphertext attack The cryptanalyst can choose different cypher-texts 
to be decrypted and has access to the decrypted plaintext . For example, the 
cryptanalyst has access to a tamperproof box that does automatic decryption. 
The problem is to deduce the key. This attack is primarily applicable to public-
key algorithms. A chosen-cyphertext attack is sometimes effective against 
a symmetric algorithm as well. (A chosen-plaintext attack and a chosen-
cyphertext attack are together known as a chosen-text attack). 
Chosen-key attack This attack does not mean that the cryptanalyst can choose 
the key; it means that there is some knowledge about the relationship between 
different keys - it is a rather obscure attack and not very practical. 
2.2 Chaotic Dynamics 
2.2.1 Dynamic Systems 
A dynamic continuous-state continuous-time system S = (X, K, 1) depending on 
parameters can be considered in the following form 
dx 
- = f(x,k), 
dt 
x E X C Rd k EKe Rdg 
-) - , 
where f : X x K --+ Y is a smooth vector function, X is a state space, and K 
is a parameter space. The equation satisfies the conditions of the existence and 
uniqueness of solutions x(t, xo) with the initial condition Xo = x (0, xo) [4, 11]. The 
solution curve x (t, xo), is called the trajectory. 
In cryptography, we focus on a dynamic discrete-time system, which can be 
written in the following form: 
Xn+l = f(xn,k), Xn E X ~ Rd,k E K ~ Rdg ,n = 0,1,2, ... (2.2) 
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 36 
where Xi is a discrete state of the system. The trajectory <p (i, xo) is defined by the 
sequence Xo, Xl, X2, . .. Clearly, equation (2.2) is similar to a cryptographic iterated 
function, used in PRNG, block ciphers and other constructions (see Figures 2.1-
2.4). Consequently, in both nonlinear dynamics and cryptography we deal with an 
iterated key-dependent transformation of information. 
2.2.2 Chaotic Systems 
There are several sufficient conditions satisfied by a dynamic system to guarantee 
chaos [29]; the sensitivity to initial conditions and topological transitivity are the 
most common. 
Definition 2 (chaotic dynamic system, [31, 79, 29, 4]) A chaotic continuous-state 
discrete-time system (continuous chaos for short) is a dynamic system S = (X, f) 
with two properties: 
1. Given a metric space X ~ RN and a mapping f : X ~ X I we say that f is 
topological transitive on X if for any two open sets U, V C X I there is n ~ 0 
such that r(U) n V i= 0. 
2. The map f is said to be sensitive to initial conditions if there is 6 > 0, n ~ 0 
such that for any X E X and for any neighborhood Hx of X there is y E HXI 
such that Ir(x) - r(y)1 > o. 
This can be interpreted in natural language as follows: a dynamic system is 
chaotic if all trajectories are bounded and nearby trajectories diverge exponentially 
at every point of the phase space (see Figure 2.51). A synergy between chaotic and 
cryptographic systems section 2.1 can be described as follows: 
ITrajectories illustrated in Figures 2.5 are continuous and belong to a two dimensional system 
said to be chaotic. This diagram should be interpreted only as an example to be extended in more 
dimensions. Clearly, a 2D dynamic system with continuous trajectories cannot be chaotic (other-
wise any interception of trajectories will lead to periodical cycles) unlike 3 or more dimensional 
system. This note should not be applied to discrete-time system (2 .2) where chaotic behavior is 
possible in 1 or 2 dimensions. 
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Figure 2.5: A two-dimensional chaotic system: (a) Time space; (b) Phase space. 
The topological transitivity ensures that the system output covers all the state 
space e.g. any plaintext can be encrypted into any ciphertext. 
The sensit iv ity to the initial condition corresponds to Shannon's requirements 
for an encryption system (section 2.1.5) . In both chaos and cryptography we 
are dealing with systems in which "a small variation of any variable changes 
the outputs considerably" [92 ]. 
2.2. 3 Attractors 
Most nonlinear systems are unpredictable and yet patterned, it is called strange 
and since it tends to produce a fractal2 geometric shape. It is said to be attracted 
to that shape. Tsonis defines attractor as "a limit set that collects trajectories" 
[96]. When we observe the dynamic behaviour of the state point in the state space 
we can notice that traj ectories tend to contract in certain areas; this contraction is 
called the attractor. The attractor is actually a set of points such that all trajectories 
2The term fractal was coined by Benoit Mandelbrot in 1975. It comes from the Latin fractus, 
meaning an irregular surface like that of a broken stone. Fractals are non-regular geometric shapes 
that have the same degree of non-regularity on all scales. "Fractal Geometry plays two roles. It 
is the geometry of deterministic chaos and it can also describe the geometry of mountains, clouds 
and galaxies"-Benoit Mandelbrot. 
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nearby converge to it. At the same time, by definition, nearby trajectories diverge 
exponentially at every point. The coexistence of these two properties is another 
reason for the 'strange name' of the attractor. 
Chaos is centered on the concept of the strange attractor. If we watch the 
flow of water from a faucet we turn, so the water goes faster and faster; we will 
see activity from smooth delivery to gushing states. These various kinds of flow 
represent different patterns to which the flow is attracted. 
The four kinds of attractors are: 
1. Point attractor, such as a pendulum swinging back and forth and eventually 
stopping at a point. The attractor may come as a point, in which case, it gives 
a steady state where no change is made. 
2. Periodic attractor, just add a mainspring to the pendulum to compensate for 
friction and the pendulum now has a limited cycle in its phase space. The 
periodic attractor portrays processes that repeat themselves . 
3. Torus attractor, picture walking on a large doughnut, going over , under and 
around its outside surface area, circling, but never repeating exactly the same 
path you went before. The torus attractor depicts processes that stay in a 
confined area but wander from place to place in that area. 
4. Strange attractor, this attractor deals with the three-body problem of stability. 
The strange attractor shows processes that are stable, confined and yet never 
do the same thing twice. Three non-linear equation solutions exhibit a fractal 
structure in computer simulations of the strange attractor. In other words, 
each solution curve tended to the same area, the attractor area, and cycled 
around randomly without any particular set number of times, never crossing 
itself, staying in the same phase space, and displaying self-similarity at any 
scale. The operative term here is self-similarity. Each event, each process, each 
period, each end-state in phase-space is never precisely identical to another; 
it is similar but not identical.The attractor acts on the system as a whole and 
collects the trajectories of perturbation in the environment. Though these 
systems are unstable, they have patterned order and boundary. 
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The term 'attractor' has no counterpart in cryptography, precisely, cryptography 
attempts to hide the attractor and any other recognizable structure of the system, 
making it unpredictable. 
2.2.4 Lyapunov Exponents 
Definition 2 introduced the concept of the sensitivity to the initial condition. The 
Lyapunov exponent, denoted by A(XO), is a quantitative measure of the exponential 
divergence of trajectories starting from the neighborhood of Xo [16]. For a one-
dimensional system 
Ir (xo + E) - r (xo )1 = E· enoX(xo) , 
where E is a small perturbation from the initial condition Xo and n is the number of 
iterations (the discrete time) . Generally, A depends on the initial condition, so we 
can estimate its average value. In a measure-preserving system (2.2.6) A is constant 
for all trajectories. The Lyapunov exponent is given by the limit 
'() 1· 1· 11 !r(XO +E)-r(xO)! A Xo = 1m 1m - og 
n-OOe-On E 
(2.3) 
or 
1 n 1 n 
A (Xo ) = lim - "log If' (Xk )1 = lim -log II If' (xk )1 (2.4) 
n-oo n L.-t n-oo n k=l k=l 
For each k, l' (Xk ) tells us how much the function f is changing with respect to its 
argument at the point Xk. This derivative expresses the magnitude of change in the 
transition from Xk to Xk+l. The limit of the average of the derivative logarithms over 
n iterations is taken to provide a measure of how fast the orbit changes as (discrete) 
time propagates. A positive Lyapunov exponent is an indication of chaotic behavior. 
For a d-dimensional system we have a set A = {AI, ... , Ad} and more complex 
behavior, but still qualitatively the same as the one dimensional case [78]. 
A more accurate measure is the Kolmogorov-Sinai (KS) entropy because it con-
siders the resolution (the precision) under which the system is observed. Chapter 3 
studies the complexity of chaotic systems using the KS entropy. 
From the view point of cryptography, A measures the encryption efficiency. Lar-
ger A indicates that fewer cryptography transformation will be required to reach a 
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certain level of the ciphertext unpredictability. Chapter 4 provides numeric values 
of >. for certain chaos-based encryption systems. 
2.2.5 Bifurcation 
The term bifurcation (from Latin bifurcus - two pronged) usually means a qualitative 
transformation from regular to chaotic behavior as a control parameter is smoothly 
varied. There are several types of bifurcation; the best known is period doubling 
discovered by Feighenbaum (see Figure 4.9). In bifurcation points, the number of 
equilibrium states doubles. As the control parameter increases, this happens more 
often, finally, when the number of possible states is infinitely large, the system 
becomes chaotic. 
Certain cryptographic applications use control parameters as a key. Clearly, the 
key space should correspond to chaotic behavior. In a good encryption system, 
the number of states and the length of orbits should not depend on the choice of 
parameters. 
2.2.6 Ergodic and Mixing Systems 
Let the dynamic system S = (X,1) have a f-invariant measure f.L [8], f.L (X) < 00, 
that is 
\fAEa(X), f.L (A) = f.L (I-I (A)) , 
where a (X) is the a-algebra of measurable subsets of X. Assume the I-invariant 
measure is equivalent to the Lebesgue with the density function 9 (x) bounded with 
some positive constants gl and g2: 
0< g1 < 9 (x) < g2, 
where \fA E a (X) , f.L (A) = fA 9 (x) dx. If gl is close to g2 then the measure f.L is 
close to the uniform distribution. 
A dynamic system S = (X,1) is ergodic if it has only trivial invariant sets, i. e. if 
and only if either f.L (A) = 0 or f.L (X \ A) = 0 , whenever A is a measurable, invariant 
under I, subset of the space X (the invariance of A means I (A) c A). Ergodicity 
implies that the space X cannot be divided into invariant nontrivial (with respect to 
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the measure J.L) disjoint parts (in the case of smaller disjoint parts, any brute force 
attack is restricted to one part of the partition i.e. an intruder will have to search 
through the whole state space X) [95]. 
A dynamical system S = (X, 1) is mixing if it satisfies the condition 
VC,P E a(X), lim (J.L (J-n (C) n P)) = J.L (C). 
n--+oo J.L (P) J.L (X) 
If J.L (X) = 1 (the measure J.L is probabilistic) we can write 
The mixing property implies that the part of P, which after n iterations of f is 
contained in C is asymptotically proportional to the volume (in the sense of the 
measure J.L) of C in X. Moreover, the iterations of f make each set C statistically 
independent from P (asymptotically). In other words, the trajectory starting at a 
fixed point Xo EX, after n iterations reaches any region with the same probability. 
Vice versa, for a fixed final state Xn and sufficiently large n, any state Xo is f../,-
equiprobable [68] (see also section 3.6). 
2.2.7 Binary Chaos 
We have discussed the main properties of chaos defined on real numbers. However, 
digital cryptography is based on discrete state systems. 
In 1998 Waelbroeck and Zertuche [97] proposed a theory of deterministic chaos 
for binary systems. Binary systems, like a cellular automata and neural networks, 
are the best known class of chaotic discrete systems. Consider a state space 
The system state a E n is given by a sequence of symbols (bits): 
a = a(1)a(2) ... a(n) . . . 
A natural topological measure for binary systems is the Hamming distance defined 
as 
n 
dH(a, a') == ~ /a(i) - a'( i) / , 
i=l 
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(a) (b) 
n n 
Figure 2.6: Binary Chaos: the sensitivity to the initial condition (a) and the topo-
logical transitivity (b) are defined on the space D. 
i. e. dH is a number of bits by which the two strings a and 0/ differ. However, in the 
limit n --t 00 (infinite strings) the Hamming distance cannot define the topology of 
D. For this case we can introduce a topological base 
N n(a) = {a' E DJa(i) = a'(i), Vi < n}, 
where n = 1, 2,3 . . .. Now we can generalize the definition of chaos from Rd to D: 
Definition 3 (binary chaos, [97]) Let A c D and f : A --t A. The binary system 
(A , f) is said chaotic, if two following conditions are satisfied: 
1. The function f is topological transitive on A , i. e. for all open subsets U, V c A 
it exists n E Z such as r(U) n V i= 0 (Figure 2.6-b)3. 
2. The function f is sensitive to the initial conditions on A , i. e. for all a E A and 
Nm(a) it exists n , kEN and a' E (Nm(a) n A), such as r(a') tt N n(r(a )) 
(Figure 2.6-a). 
Hence, a chaotic binary system is defined in a similar way as real space chaos . 
Section 4.3 discusses the Lyapunov exponent for finite st ate systems , and Sections 3.6 
and 4.3.5 show that conventual cryptographic schemes can be considered as 'limited' 
binary chaos. 
3 If n < 0 and f is not invertible, we assume r(U) = {a E AIJ- n(a) E U}. 
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x, 
Figure 2.7: Phase portraits of chaotic and cryptographic systems.A chaotic system 
(left) usually has an attractor with a fractal dimension (less than the number of 
independent variables). A cryptographic system (right) attempts to maximize the 
dimension up to an integer. 
2.3 Relationship between Chaos and Cryptography 
So far, we have considered cryptographic systems from the view point of synergetics 
and chaotic dynamics. Clearly, chaos theory and cryptography studies a nonlinear 
iterative transformation depending on parameters. Such properties as sensitivity to 
initial conditions, exponential divergence of trajectories and mixing can be applied 
in both areas. 
In terms of the object of study the following differences are important: 
1. Chaos theory studies nonlinear systems defined on an infinite state space (e.g 
vectors of real numbers or infinite binary strings), whereas cryptography relies 
on a finite-state machine (computer). All chaos models implemented on a 
computer are approximations, i. e. pseudo-chaos. 
2. Chaos theory studies the asymptotic behavior of a nonlinear system (n -t 00), 
whereas cryptography focuses on the effect of a small number of iterations 
(n « 00). For example, n = 16 in a block cipher and n rv [message size] in 
a stream cipher. 
3. Classical chaotic systems have visually recognizable attractors (the phase space 
portrait of the system) whose dimension is fractional4 . Cryptography at-
tempts to maximize the attractor dimension to an integer, the topological 
4We say a set is n-dimensional if we need n independent variables to exactly identify any state 
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dimension, and to hide any visible structure (see Figure 2.7). Unlike chaos in 
general, cryptographic systems use all combinations of independent variables 
to be most unpredictable for an observer. 
4. The concepts of cryptographic security and effi ciency have no counterparts in 
chaos theory. 
The following table summarizes the relationship between the concepts. 
Chaos theory 
chaotic system 
- nonlinear transformation 
- infinite number of states 
- infinite number of iterations 
initial condition 
final state 
initial conditions and parameters 
asymptotic independence of the initial 
and final states 
the sensitivity to the initial condition 
and parameters, mixing 
Cryptography 
pseudo-chaotic system 
- nonlinear transformation 
- finite number of states 
- finite number of iterations 
plaintext 
ciphertext 
key 
confusion 
diffusion 
It is natural to suggest using known chaotic systems for the purpose of encryp-
tion. Section 3.6 provides a theoretical construction of a chaos-based PRNG and 
Chapter 4 is devoted to its computer implementations (pseudo-chaos). 
of the system. This notion of dimension is called the topological dimension of a set. Fractal objects, 
in particular, chaotic attractors, can have less degrees of freedom than its topological dimension 
because not all combinations of independent variables are possible. For example, a geometrical 
fractal plotted on a 2D plane might have the dimension greater than 1 (corresponding to line) and 
less than 2 (corresponding to surface). 
Chapter 3 
Randomness, 
Complexity and Chaos. 
The concepts of randomness, unpredictability, complexity and entropy form the 
basis of modern cryptography. Mathematically, the design of a cryptosystem can be 
interpreted as the design of a key-dependent bij ective transformation, most unpre-
dictable for an observer with a given amount of resources. 
The present chapter links these concepts with chaotic dynamics and suggests a 
pseudo-random generator based on a chaotic system. 
3.1 Informal Overview 
In studying a cryptosystem (PRNG, encryption algorithm or key exchange scheme), 
a cryptanalyst has access to time series of this dynamic system and knows the 
iterated function (the algorithm). However, the time series is not a compact subset of 
the trajectory (intermediate states are hidden) and the iterated function has a secret 
parameter (the key). We can think of the sample as being 'random', 'unpredictable' 
and 'complex'. What do these properties mean mathematically? How do they relate 
to chaos? This chapter attempts to give an answer. 
Perfect security is achieved when the cryptosystem is absolutely unpredict-
able for an external observer, i.e. all possible outcomes (states, sub-trajectories) are 
equiprobable and do not depend on the previous states. In other words, the state 
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pseudo-randomness 
computational 
unpredictability 
true randomness 
absolute 
unpredictability 
algorithmic randomness 
incompressibility 
Figure 3.1: Relationship between the concepts. 
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sequence has a uniform probability distribution and no correlations (patterns). The 
concept of absolute unpredictability is equivalent to the true randomness and re-
lated to the white noise. A source of the white noise can be a highly dimensional 
system (e. g. microscopic motion in the ideal gas). 
In the real world, cryptographic systems provide a certain level of practical 
security that is much 'lower' that the perfect security (due to usability and cost 
reasons). At this level we deal with 'pseudo' concepts . Pseudo-random sequences 
cannot be efficiently distinguished from the uniform noise by known algorithms. 
Similarly, computationally unpredictable sequences cannot be predicted with the 
available computer re::;ources. It is possible to show that the pseudo-random se-
quence (cryptosystem) is computationally unpredictable, and vice versa. 
Together with probabilistic properties we shall consider the algorithmic com-
plexity, i.e. the length of the shortest algorithm producing the cryptographic se-
quence. Intuitively, the (internal) complexity of the system provides the (external) 
unpredictability. A sequence is called algorithmically random, if its algorithmic 
complexity equals the length of the sequence. An algorithmically random sequence 
is computationally incompressible and contains no recognizable patterns (re-
dundancies). 
Clearly, a purely random system is also algorithmically random (Figure 3.1). 
The concepts of pseudo and algorithmic randomness are different: a pseudo-random 
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generator 
with a constant 
state 
H = ] 
K = ] 
generator of 
pseudo-random 
states, 
pseudo-chaos 
entropy 
complexity 
chaotic 
generator 
Figure 3.2: Scale of the entropy 
white 
noise 
generator 
H->oo ) 
K->oo ) 
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string is generated with a compact seed, but the external observer is not able (prac-
tically) to reconstruct the generator and predict the sequence. In other words, the 
string is highly compressible for authorized communication parties, but computa-
tionally incompressible for the adversary. In the general case, an algorithmic random 
string can be predicted by a probabilistic machine. 
Randomness or unpredictability can be 'measured' using such properties as the 
algorithmic complexity or the entropy i.e. the degree of our uncertainty about 
the system. Quantitatively, the Shannon entropy is in direct proportion to the 
algorithmic complexity (in ergodic systems, where statistical properties of a single 
sequence coincides with that of all sequences, emitted by a generator). A randomness 
measure for chaos is the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy that is, roughly speaking, a multi-
resolution integration of Lyapunov exponents. 
A 'fully predictable' system has a well-know state, its complexity is 1. A fully 
unpredictable system (the uncorrelated white noise) is an infinite source of inform-
ation and infinite complexity and entropy (Figure 3.2). Cryptographic systems are 
somewhere in-between: they are complex enough to be unpredictable by an external 
observer, but not too much to be reproducible. 
The following types of chaos can be considered in the context of cryptography: 
Natural chaos (e.g. the environment) is a highly dimensional system with infin-
itely many states and independent variables. Generally, the entropy of such a 
system is not maximal because of its self-organization and correlations. There 
are cryptographic applications using natural chaos; for example, Intel's hard-
ware RNG captures randomness from the thermal noise of the computer. Such 
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random sequences are used only in key generation, not in encryption, because 
they are not reproducible. 
Low-dimension (mathematical) chaos has infinitely many states and a small 
number of independent variables. Still, such systems cannot be applied to 
digital encryption because they cannot be implemented on a finite-state ma-
chine. This chapter discusses the cryptographic properties of mathematical 
chaos and studies a chaos-based PRNG with infinite states. In the following 
chapter we attempt to transform the results into different types of approxim-
ations (pseudo-chaos). 
3.2 Complexity Theory Approach 
3.2.1 Turing Machine 
Throughout this thesis we will use the common terminology from complexity theory 
[5, 73J. For the sake of self-sufficiency we provide a brief introduction to the subject. 
A Turing machine is a hypothetical device that can theoretically implement any 
computer algorithm. It provides a unified framework to measure the complexity (i.e. 
program length and working time) of computational problems such as generating, 
transforming and matching cryptographic sequences. 
A basic model of a Turing machine consists of (1) a semi-infinite tape divided 
into cells, (2) a read-write head (3) a control unit, which is a finite-state sequential 
machine. We denote a Turing machine as 
T = (S, A, r, F, qo) , 
where S is the finite state set of the control; A is the finite tape alphabet (A = 
{O, I}); r is a finite rule state of the form,: S x A -+ S x A x {L, N, R}; F ~ Sis 
a set of halting accepting states; and qo E S is the initial state. The state {L, N, R} 
includes tape commands: 'move left' (L), 'stay in place' (N) and 'move right' (P). 
The machine configuration T is the triplet (s, a, i), where s E S is the current state, 
a E A* the tape string, and 1 ~ i ~ lal is the head position counting from the left 
end of the tape. 
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The machine is initialized in the following way: (1) a string a C A* is loaded 
onto the tape; (2) the head is seeded to the leftmost position; and (3) the initial 
state q is assigned to the state variable s. In every step, (1) the machine reads a 
symbol from the current cell, depending on the symbol read and the current state, 
(2) it makes a transition to a new state; (2) it overwrites the current cell with a new 
symbol; (3) it moves the head one step left or right, or stays in place. The machine 
halts when a state f E F is reached. 
A Turing machine is said to accept a string a if a sequences of rules ')'1 , ... ,')'m C 
r* exists that puts the machine from the initial state So to any halting accepting 
state f E F. The machine rejects a string, if it halts in s tJ. F or if it never halts. 
Turing machines may take several other forms: (a) The tape may be extended 
to make it doubly infinite; (b) One or more additional tapes may be added; (c) The 
storage medium may be the plane ruled into squares or n-dimensional space ruled 
into n-dimensional cubes. It can be shown that each of these extensions of the basic 
machine are equivalent in the sense that a basic machine can be constructed that 
'simulates' the behavior of the extended machine. 
A language L over a finite alphabet A is a subset (A)*, i.e. a subset of all finite 
strings over A. A machine is said to accept a language C if it accepts all the strings 
a E C and rejects (3 tJ. c. 
A deterministic Turing machine has single-valued rules')' : S x A ~ S x A x 
{L, N , R}, i.e. there are no rules with the same left parts S x A. By contrast, 
nondeterministic machines may have multi-valued rules. 
If there exists a polynomial P (l), limiting the machine working time m (the 
number of steps) depending of the input string length l (m < p (l)), the machine 
is said to run in polynomial time. The complexity class P is the set of languages 
accepted by deterministic polynomial-time machines . The complexity class NP is 
the set of languages accepted by nondeterministic polynomial-time machines. 
A Probabilistic Turing machine is a deterministic Turing machine that can flip 
a fair coin to determine its next move. A probabilistic machine is said to accept a 
language C if it enters an accepting state for a E C with the probability Pi > 2/3 
and it halts a tJ. C with the probability Po > 2/3. 
The complexity class BPP consists of all languages recognized by probabilistic 
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polynomial-time machines. 
3.2.2 Algorithmic Complexity 
The concept of algorithmic complexity was suggested independently by three math-
ematicians A. N. Kolmogorov, P. Solomonov and G. J. Chaitin: 
Definition 4 The algorithmic complexity KM (a) of a finite string a E {O, l}n with 
respect to a Turing Machine M is the length l(7r) of the smallest computer program 
7r, which generate it, that is 
Kolmogorov showed, that there exists a universal Turing machine U, that per-
forms computations equivalent to 7r (designed for an arbitrary machine M), and the 
changes of 7r required to adopt it for U depend on M but not on a. Consequently, 
the algorithmic complexity KM with respect to any machine M is related to Ku(S) 
by 
(3 .1) 
where eM is a constant, which is independent from a [21]. Hereafter we omit the 
subscript U assuming K(a) = Ku(a). 
Unfortunately, algorithmic complexity cannot be commuted i.e. there is no uni-
versal solution for simplifying programs and for proving that the length is minimal. 
We cannot apply this definition directly to compare the complexity of cryptographic 
sequences or algorithms. Nevertheless the theoretical applications are very import-
ant. In particular, the Kolmogorov complexity provides a unified approach to the 
problem of data compressibility. 
3.2.3 Compressibility and Algorithmic Randomness 
A string an oflength n is said to be c-incompressible if K(an) 2 n-c. Incompressible 
strings (c = 0 or relatively small) are called algorithmically random. 
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3.2.4 Symbolic Complexity 
For an infinite string a(XJ or a generator, it is interesting to consider the symbolic 
complexity given by the limit 
. K(an ) 
c(a(XJ) = hm --. 
n->(XJ n (3.2) 
From (3.1) it follows that the symbolic complexity c(a(XJ) is invariant with respect 
to the choice of Turing machine. If a string has a finite Kolmogorov complexity (e. g. 
a pseudo-random string), its symbolic complexity tends to O. A truly random string 
has c = 1 because its length equals the length of the shortest program. Clearly, 
c > 0 if and only if the generator has infinite complexity. In chaotic systems, this 
happens if the complexity of the initial conditions is infinitely large or a certain 
amount of randomness gets into the system from the environment. 
3.3 Information Theory Approach 
A cryptanalyst considers the cryptosystem as a source of information. In studying 
statistical properties of the ciphertext, he/she attempts to reconstruct the secret 
transformation (precisely, secret parameters of a known algorithm) . In ideal cryptosys-
terns, the distribution of the ciphertext cannot be differentiated from the uniform 
noise, and thus provides no useful information for an adversary. 
The two major approaches to statistical analysis of cryptographic strings are as 
follows: 
• Studying properties of one particular string leads to complexity theory as 
introduced in Section 3.2 . 
• By contrast, information theory founded by Shannon [91] describes the prop-
erties of all strings produced by the source (cryptosystem). 
In ergodic systems (in which statistical properties of a particular string coincides 
with that of all strings emitted by a generator) both approach can be unified (see 
section 3.3.3). 
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3.3.1 True Randomness 
We define a Probability Distribution Function (PDF) as a function from strings £ = 
{ aj } to nonnegative real numbers, i.e. Pr : £ -> [0, 1] such that L:aEC Pr (a) = 1. 
Definition 5 A string a is called truly (purely) random (or unpredictable) if for 
any substrings (3n, In E a, 0 < n < length(a) 
A truly random string cannot be predicted, i.e. for any symbol Si E a, the 
conditional probability Pr(si!si-l, Si-2, ... ) = Pr(si). In other words, an arbitrary 
large knowledge about the previous states does not increase the probability of the 
successful prediction of the next state. 
An infinite and truly random string has a delta autocorrelation function, and an 
infinite and uniform power spectrum (white noise). 
3.3.2 Shannon Entropy 
Claude Shannon generalized the term entropy from thermodynamics to abstract 
problems in communication and information theories [91]. The entropy measures 
the amount of informatirm required to determine precisely the system state among 
all possible states. In other words, it is a relative degree of our uncertainty or the 
lack of information we have about the exact state of a system. In cryptography, the 
entropy is related the unpredictability of an encryption system for an adversary. 
The entropy of a string an of the length n is defined as 
(3.3) 
where Pr : An -> [0, 1] is the PDF of an on the set of n-th symbol strings. The 
maximum of Hn is achieved when Pr (an) is a uniform distribution (the string is 
truly random). 
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The conditional entropy hn denotes the average amount of information supplied 
with each (n + l)-th symbol provided the previous n symbols are known: 
In other words, hn quantifies the average uncertainty when predicting the next 
symbol. As soon as the knowledge about a previous state cannot increase the un-
certainty, the function Hn is non decreasing and hn+1 ~ hn · 
For a stationary information source there exists a limit 
H 
hSh = lim hn = lim ~, 
n~oo n--+oo n 
called the entropy of information source (cryptographic system). 
(3.4) 
If ex is a k-th order Markov sequence, hn = hSh for all n 2: k. A Markov 
sequence corresponds to a deterministic process, in which the next state depends on 
the previous k states, that is 
Examples of Markov process can be found in most cryptographic systems such as 
PRNG 's and block ciphers. 
3.3.3 Entropy-Gomplexity Relationship 
Intuitively, complexity and the entropy are related as 'cause and effect': the more 
complex the internal organization of a system, the more unpredictable its behavior 
is and the higher the entropy is. The complexity is the size of the 'internal program' 
that generates a state sequence (string), whereas the entropy is computed from the 
probability distribution of this sequence. Formally, the following result is applied to 
stationary ergodic sources [281: 
lim {Kn} = _1_ , 
n->oo H n In 2 
(3.5) 
where {Kn} = L:anE {O ,l}n Pr(exn)K(exn). Hence, the average complexity {Kn} is 
asymptotically proportional (with the coefficient In 2) to the entropy as n increases. 
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3.4 Entropy and Complexity of Chaotic Systems 
3.4.1 Partitioning and Symbolic Dynamics 
Consider a chaotic system S = (X, f) with an f-invariant measure f..L (see Sec-
tion 2.2). Any set of m disjoint regions which covers the state space X is a partition 
denoted by 
i=m U Xi = X, Xi n Xj = 0, Vi of. j. 
i=l 
A unique symbol Si E A is assigned to every region Xi ' The process of parti-
tioning the state space, assigning symbols to every region from the partition, and 
the resulting macroscopic dynamics are called symbolic dynamics [55]. A function 
a can define partitions and their symbolic names: 
a (x) = {Si E Alx E Xi}' 
A trajectory ¢(xo) passing across the subsets Xi produces a symbolic trajectory 
a(xo)· 
3.4.2 Kolmogorov-Sinai Entropy 
The Lyapunov exponents (Section 2.2.4) measure how fast we loose the capability 
to predict the behavior of a chaotic system in time. The disadvantage is that this 
measure does not consider the resolution under which the system is observed, unlike 
the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy [16, 9, 28]. 
Let the partition (3 = {Xl, X 2 , . .. , Xm} be the observer's resolution. Looking 
at the system state x, the observer can only determine the fact that x E Xi and 
reconstruct the symbolic trajectory an = {Sm!, Sm2' ... , smn } corresponding to the 
regions visited. The entropy of a trajectory an with the respect to partition (3 is 
given by 
where Pr (an) is the probability of occurrence of the substring an. The conditional 
entropy of the (n + l)-th symbol provided the previous n symbols are known is 
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defined as 
hi3 = hi3 = { H~+l - H~, 
n n+lln H i3 
1 , 
n~l 
n=l 
The entropy for a partition (3 is given by 
hi3 = lim h~ = lim ~H~. 
n-+oo n-+oo n 
The Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy of a chaotic system is the supremum over all possible 
partitions 
(3.6) 
The KS entropy equals zero for regular systems, is finite and positive for a determin-
istic chaos and infinite for a random process. It is related to the Lyapunov exponents 
by hJ(s = L:lS;d~D Ad and proportional to the time horizon T on which the system 
is predictable. 
3.4.3 Complexity of the Trajectory 
The complexity of the trajectory of a point Xo with respect to a finite opening 
coverings (3 is defined as 
where [7j;(x) ]n = {anIP(xo) E Xj} and K(an) is the algorithmic complexity of a. 
The complexity of the trajectory of a point Xo is 
Definition 6 (algorithmically random trajectory, [30 , 101]) The trajectory of a 
point Xo is called algorithmically random if its complexity is positive, that is c(xo) > 
O. 
The Brudno and White theorem defines the relationship between the KS entropy 
and complexity: 
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Theorem 1 (complexity of the trajectory, [30 ,101]) The symbolic trajectories of al-
most all x E X (with respect to the invariant measure /1-) are algorithmically random 
and their complexity is given by 
( ) _ hJ(s C X - In2' (3 .7) 
Though it is practically impossible to quantify the algorithmic complexity of a string, 
most strings over a finite alphabet produced by a chaotic system are algorithmically 
random. 
3.5 Pseudo-Randomness 
3.5.1 Probabilistic Ensembles 
Let Pri(a) be a probability distribution function of strings {O, l}l(i), where l(i ) is a 
positive polynomial. We write IT = {Pr;} iE I for an ensemble of distributions indexed 
by leN. The ensemble of the uniform distributions ITo = {Pro,;} iEN for all i E N 
and a, (3 E {O, I} i satisfies PrO,i (a) = PrO,i ((3). 
To measure the 'degree of randomness' of a string its probability ensemble should 
be compared with that of the uniform distributions. Having limited resources, com-
puters can process only a subset of distributions. Thus, we introduce the concept 
of polynomial indistinguishability. Roughly speaking, two probabilistic ensembles 
are polynomially indistinguishable if they assign 'about the same' mass to the same 
subsets of strings, efficiently recognized by a Turing machine: 
Definition 7 (polynomial indistinguishability, [105, 50, 65]) Let ITl = {Prl,i};EI 
and IT2 = {Pr2,i};EI be two probability ensembles each indexed by I. Let T be a 
probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine called a test. The test gets two inputs: 
an index i and a string a. Let PrJ (i) be the probability that, on input index i and a 
string a chosen according to the distribution Prl ,i, the test T outputs 1. Similarly, 
Prf (i) denotes the probability that, on input index i and a string a chosen according 
to the distribution Pr2,i , the test T outputs 1. We say that III and IT2 are indis-
tinguishable with polynomial p(i) if for all probabilistic polynomial-time tests T and 
sufficiently large i E N 
1 
IprJ (i) - Prf (i)1 < p(i)' 
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Definition 8 (pseudo-random probability ensemble, [105, 50, 65]) The probability 
ensemble II = {PriLEI is said to be pseudo-random if for any positive polynomial 
p( i), the ensemble II is indistinguishable with p( i) from the uniform ensemble IIo = 
{Pro ,i LEI· 
Definition 9 (unpredictable probability ensemble, [105 , 50, 65]) Let II = {Prl,;} iE i 
be a probabilistic ensemble indexed by I . Let T be a probabilistic ensemble polynomial-
time Turing machine that on input (index i and a string a), outputs a single bit, 
called the guess. Let bit (a, r) denote the r-th bit of the sequence a, and pref (a, r) 
denote the prefix ofr bits of the string a, {i. e. pref (a, r) = bit(o., 1) bit(o., 2) ... bit(o. , r )). 
W e say that the machine T predicts the next bit of II, if for some polynomial p( i) 
and infinitely many i's, 
Pr (M (i,pref(o., r)) = bit(o., r + 1)) 2 ~ + pti)' 
where the probability space is that of the string a chosen according to Prl ,i, and the 
integer r chosen at random with uniform distribution in {O, 1, ... , l (a) - I}. We 
say that II is unpredictable if there exists no probabilistic polynomial time machine 
T which predicts the next bit of II. 
Theorem 2 [27, 50, 65] The probability ensemble II is pseudo-random if and only 
if II is unpredictable. 
3.5.2 One-Way Function 
One-way functions are functions that are easy to evaluate (fJ = f( o. )), but hard 
(on the average) to invert (a = f-l( fJ )). The computational gap between forward 
and inverse evaluation quantifies the efficiency of the one-way transformation. This 
is related to the so-called inverse problems including inverse scattering theory for 
example, for which exact solutions are rare in practice, the problems ill-posed in 
most cases. 
It is widely believed, but not proven that one-way functions exists. However, 
one-way functions lie at the heart of modern cryptography, in particular, they are 
used in public-key schemes. 
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A function is called length-preserving (denoted by 1: 1) if the binary length of 
its argument a equals the length of the result (3. An important application of the 
one-way 1:1 function is the PRNG. 
If a one-way function is not length-preserving [length( a) > length({3)], it is called 
a hash-function. Hash functions are used, for example, in digital signature schemes. 
A formal definition of one-way function is given in terms of complexity theory: 
Definition 10 (one-way function [27, 50, 65]) A function f : {O, I}* -> {O, I}* zs 
called one way if it satisfies the following 
1. There is a deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine that on input a re-
turns f(a) 
2. For any probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine M, any positive polyno-
mial p( n) and sufficiently large n 
1 
Pr(M(J(a), In) E f-l(a)) < p(n)' 
where the probability is taken over all possible choices of a E {O, I}fI and the 
internal tosses of M conform to a uniform probability distribution. The role 
of 1 fI is to allow machine M to run in a time polynomial over the length of 
the pre-image it is supposed to find. 
A stronger notion of unpredictability is that of a hard-core predicate. A polynomial-
time computable predicat.e b is called a hard-core of a function f if all algorithms, 
given f(a), can guess b(a) only with a probable success which is negligibly better 
than half. 
Definition 11 (hard-core predicate, [27, 50, 65]) Let f : {O,I}* -> {O,I}* and 
f: {O, I}* -> {O, I}. The predicate b is said to be hard-core of the function f, if 
1. There is a deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine that on input a re-
turns b(a); 
2. There is no probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine M such that for any 
positive polynomial p( n) and sufficiently large n 
1 1 
Pr(M(J(a), In) = b(a))) < 2 + p(n)' 
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where the probability is taken over all possible choices of a E {o , l}n and the 
internal tosses of M conform to a uniform probability distribution. 
Theorem 3 (existence of a one-way function with a hard-core predicate, [105 , 72, 
50]) If there exists a one-way function, then there exists a one-way function with a 
hard-core predicate. 
3.5.3 Pseudo-Random Generators 
The role of pseudo-random (number) generators (PRNG) in cryptography has already 
been discussed in Section 2.1.4. Roughly speaking, a PRNG is an efficient (determ-
inistic) algorithm that on input a short seed, outputs a (typically much) longer 
sequence that is computationally indistinguishable from a uniformly chosen string. 
Definition 12 (pseudo-random generator, [27, 50]) Let l : N -) N satisfy l(n) > 
n for all n EN. A pseudo-random generator, with a stretch function l (n) , is a 
deterministic polynomial time algorithm G satisfying the following: 
1. For even) a E {O, 1}* it holds that [G (a)[ = l ([a[) 
2. The probabilistic ensembles n = G (Pr~) and n~(n) are computationally undis-
tinguishable. 
Theorem 4 (construction of a pseudo-random generator, [105,50]) Let f be a one-
way 1 : 1 function, and b be a hard-core predicate of f. Then 
G(a) = b(a)b(f(a)) .. . b(fl(loll-l(a)) 
is a pseudo-random generator with a stretch function l. 
Consequently, a pseudo-random generator can be constructed from anyone-way 
length-preserving function (rather then merely one-way permutations). On the other 
hand, the existence of a one-way function is a necessary condition to the existence 
of the pseudo-random generator, that is 
Theorem 5 (existence of pseudo-random generators, [60, 56, 50D Pseudo-random 
generators exists if and only if one-way functions exists. 
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Figure 3.3: A synergy between a chaotic system (top: ~ is a rounding function , xn 
is the output) and a PRNG (bottom: b is a hard-core predicate, Yn is the output). 
Assuming the existence of one-way 1:1 functions, there can exist probability 
distributions, which are not uniform and are not even statistically close to a uni-
form distribution, that, nevertheless, are computationally indistinguishable from a 
uniform distribution [65]. 
The definition of a pseudo-random generator given above cannot be applied dir-
ectly since there is no practical way to prove or check rigourously indistinguishability. 
Practical cryptography is based on passing known statistical tests (see, for ex-
ample, [85, 88, 74, 77]), which ensure the pseudo-random property of a generator. 
Moreover, it is considered that pseudo-random sequences can be used instead of 
truly random sequences in most cryptographic applications. Chapter 6 describes a 
basic approach to these statistical tests and evaluates a number of pseudo-chaotic 
systems. 
A parallel between pseudo-random generators and chaotic systems is drawn in 
Figure 3.3. Though the structure looks similar, there is a fundamental difference: 
the iterated function of a chaotic system is not required to be one-way. Chaos theory 
pays no attention to the algorithmic complexity of 1 and 1-1, which is one of the 
main problems when we apply a chaotic system to cryptography. 
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3.6 Chaos-based Pseudo-Random Generators 
Let the dynamic system (X,1) be chaotic and mixing with an i-invariant meas-
ure f.1, (Section 2.2.6). Consider a partition of X onto two f.1,-equiprobable subsets 
(Section 3.4.1), that is 
The subset Xo corresponds to binary 0, and Xl corresponds to binary 1. The system 
outputs a symbolic trajectory, which is a binary string a from the initial condition 
(the seed) Xo E X. Denote the generator as G : X ---? {O, 1}*. Then 
G(x) = a = {SJi=1,2, ... , x E X, Si E {O, I}. 
Szczepankski and Kotulski [95, 68] showed that G can produce asymptotically 
random sequences. The next theorem affirms that if we take two different seeds, 
then with probability one, we obtain two different sequences: 
Theorem 6 (the uniqueness of the trajectory, [95]) For all x EX, 
Ergodically, we expect that the number of zeros in the generated sequence is 
equal to the expected number of ones. In particular, the Birkhoff-Khinchin Ergodic 
Theorem [9] can be written as 
lim .!. ~ Xx (t(x) ) = r Xxo df.1, = f.1,(Xo), 
n->oo n ~ 0 Jx 
i=O 0 
lim .!. ~ Xx (t( x) ) = r Xx df.1, = f.1,(Xr), 
n->oo n ~ 1 } X 1 
i=O 1 
where Xx , Xx are indicator functions of Xo and Xl respectively. Since f.1,(Xo) = o 1 
f.1,(Xr) = 1/2, the average number of zeros and ones tends to n/2. 
Theorem 7 (satisfying of the monobit test, [95]) For all x E X, the number of 
zeros and ones in a are approximately the same. 
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Figure 3.4: A rarefied sample for k = 6. 
The mixing property ensures the asymptotic independence of bits: 
Theorem 8 (asymptotic independence, [95]) For all x E X and n = 1,2, ... , output 
bits S(n-l)k and Snk (considered as random variables) are asymptotically independent 
as k increases, that is 
and 
Hence, as k increases, the autocorrelation function of the string Sk, S2k, ... , Snk> ... 
(Figure 3.4) tends to a delta function . Practically, the function composition jk in-
creases nonlinearity of the relationship between Xnk and X(n-l)k. 
So far, by dropping intermediate states from a cryptographic sequence, we im-
prove its pseudo-random appearance. Also, asymptotical independence forms the 
basis of multi-round block encryption schemes and ensures that the ciphertext is 
statistically independent of the plaintext. 
An Example of Chaos based PRNG 
Consider the sawteeth map (Figure 3.5) 
Xn+l = rXn mod q, (3.8) 
where Xo E [0, q] , r = p/q > 1, and p is co-prime to q. The map is chaotic for all r 
and has Lyapunov exponent). = hJ{s = log r > 0. 
A discrete version of the sawteeth map is well known in conventional crypto-
graphy. The classical Linear Congruental Generator (LCG) is given by 
Xn+1 = (Axn + C) mod M, 
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Figure 3.5: The sawteeth map for p = 1279 and q = 255. 
where Xn E {O, 1, ... , M} and A, C, M are fixed by the designer [64J. The continuous 
sawteeth system (and LCG) shows the stretch and folder property of chaos: first, 
the the state is stretched over a large space (e.g, multiplying or raising in power); 
then folded q times into a smaller state space (using a periodical function such as 
mod, sin etc). 
However, the continuous sawteeth map, unlike the LCG, cannot tell us about 
its finite-state approximation, especially about the periodical orbits resulting in 
patterns. 
Theoretically, for large p and q, the sawteeth map is a one-way function: given 
Xn one can only guess among q equally distributed values what was the previous 
element Xn-l. In each iteration much information is lost, and the inverse sawteeth 
map is highly multi-valued. 
By applying a periodical piecewise-linear function 9 to each element of the chaotic 
sequence {xn }, i.e. 
. .. , 
we obtain a new chaotic sequence {Yn} that is unpredictable in both ways: given Yn , 
one can only guess among equally distributed values what was the previous element 
Yn-l and what will be the next element Yn+l. Periodicity provides a strong fold 
effect (g-1 becomes highly multi-valued), while piecewise-linearity ensures that the 
uniform distribution of {xn} is passed to {Yn}. For example, the function 9 can be 
another (or the same) sawteeth map. 
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We can obtain a binary sequence from {Yn} using the 1/2 threshold: 
(J(Y) = {O, Y E Yo = (0,1/2] , 
1, Y E Y1 = (1/2,1) . 
Finally, the output string can be written as 
... , 
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Thus, by defining a chaotic function f with control parameters, an additional 
transformation g and a partition function (J , a pseudo-random generator can be 
constructed. The combined effect of g and (J is that of a hard-core predicate. 
However, the one-step unpredictability of {Yn} does not guarantee that the se-
quence will be unpredictable when an adversary has access to a sufficiently long 
sequence {sn }. In other words, the vast number of samples can theoretically lead to 
the predictability of {sn}. 
Chapter 4 
Pseudo-Chaotic 
Cryptographic Systems 
This chapter studies cryptographic systems based on finite-state approximations of 
chaos (i.e. pseudo-chaos). Two approaches are considered to store the system state 
on a computer: (i) the floating-point format of real numbers and (ii) 'plain' binary 
strings or m-dimensional cubes. 
4.1 Chaos and Pseudo-Chaos 
In the previous chapter we have constructed a pseudo-random generator from a 
chaotic system. This generator produces infinite algorithmically random strings, 
furthermore, rarefied samples from these strings are asymptotically uncorrelated 
as the distance k increases. However, this result relates to truly chaotic systems 
with infinite number of states, whereas digital cryptography is based on finite-state 
computers. 
The notion of pseudo-chaos introduced in [34, 26] denotes a computer approx-
imation of chaos. The fundamental differences between mathematical chaos and 
pseudo-chaos are the following: 
• The state variable has a finite length, i.e. stores the state with a finite preci-
sion. The system has a finite number of states N. 
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Figure 4.1: Properties of chaotic and pseudo-chaotic systems. 
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• The iterated function is evaluated with approximate methods, the result is 
rounded (or truncated) to a finite precision. 
• The system is observed during a finite period of time. 
The central problem is that rounding is applied in each iteration and the error 
accumulation causes the original and the approximated processes to diverge very 
fast. As was first discovered by LorenzI, " ... a small error in the form er will produce 
an enormous error in the future. Prediction becomes impossible .. . ". Pseudo-chaos 
is a poor approximation of chaos since the approximated model does not converge 
with the original model, and, formally, exhibits non-chaotic properties : 
• All trajectories are eventually periodic, i.e. contain patterns. A cycle appears 
as soon as two states are rounded to the same approximated value. 
• Consequently, the Lyapunov exponent A (Section 2.2.4) and the KS entropy 
hJ(s (Section 3.4.2) trivially equal O. 
I Lorenz, Edward, is an American meteorologist, who discovered a stable chaotic attractor in 
the 1960s. 
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Figure 4.2: Examples of orbits of a pseudo-chaotic system. (a) Dangerously short 
orbits (unsuitable for cryptography); (b) A single orbit (the best choice for crypto-
graphy); (c) Multiple orbits with the same length (also suitable for encryption). 
Therefore, we cannot directly transfer our results about the chaotic generator to 
computer approximations (as summarized in Figure 4.1). The methods from chaos 
theory should be adopted for pseudo-chaotic systems and cryptographic applications. 
What are the minimal, typical and maximal periods of the orbits? Such questions 
are important in most cryptographic systems. In general, a pseudo-chaotic system 
produces orbits with different lengths (sometimes called random-length orbits) as 
illustrated in Figure 4.2-a. Of course, such patterns constitute serious vulnerab-
ility: a system may have weak plaintexts and weak keys resulting in recognizable 
ci phertexts. 
If a system has a stable attractor for all initial conditions and parameters, and 
all orbits have (almost) the same length (Figure 4.2-c), there are more chances to 
develop a secure encryption scheme. Nevertheless, multiple orbits narrow the search 
space during cryptanalysis. An ideal cryptosystem has a single orbit passing through 
the whole state space (Figure 4.2-b). 
The next step is to estimated ,\ of a typical orbit for time not exceeding its 
period. However, the analysis of periodic orbits depends crucially on the ordering 
with which the orbits are considered [66]. Two orderings, both corresponding to 
Lebesgue measure, are considered in the literature: ordering according to the system 
size N, and ordering according to the minimal period and then lexicographically 
within the same period. 
In the case of the sawteeth map (3.8), with r = 2, two different orderings lead to 
two opposite answers [66]: ordering by system size yields logarithmic compressibility 
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iterations, 11 
Figure 4.3: A Laypunov exponent of a chaotic (a) and pseudo-chaotic (b) system 
of information and zero finite-time (or lack of randomness), while ordering by the 
minimal period leads to positive finite-time A and randomness. 
A comparison between the average Lyapunov curve of a chaotic system and an 
analogous property of a pseudo-chaotic system is given in Figure 4.3. If the pseudo-
chaotic system has a finite precision a , then the exponential divergence given by 
ell .\ = Ir (xo + e) - r (xo)l, (4.1) n --t 00, e --t 0, 
e 
will be eventually limited .by e = a. Usually the fraction (4.1) grows exponentially 
during the first few iterations and then increases linearly until it finally levels off at 
a certain finite value. 
4.2 Floating-point Approximations of Chaos 
A floating-point and fixed point arithmetic [58] are the most straightforward solution 
of approximating a continuous system on a finite state machine (computer). Both 
approaches imply that the state of a continuous system is stored in a program 
variable under a finite resolution. A state variable x can be written as a binary 
fraction bmbm- 1 ... b1 . ala2 . .. as, where ai, bj are bits, bmbm- 1 ... b1 denotes the 
integer part and ala2 . .. as is the fractional part of x. Under a finite resolution, 
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Figure 4.4: Trajectories of a continuous-state chaotic system (4.4) and its 64-bit 
floating-point approximation. The first curve is obtained by means of the analyt-
ical solution (4.5). The rounding off error is amplified in each iteration and the 
trajectories diverge exponentially. 
instead of Xn+l = f (x), we write 
where k S; sand roundk (x) is a rounding function defined as 
The iterative rounding is accumulative and results in surprisingly different beha-
vior of pseudo-chaos compared with its continuum counterparts. Figure 4.4 shows 
how fast the original and approximated trajectories diverge. 
For cryptographic applications, the rounding off function exposes another danger. 
Rounding or truncating the state (e.g. to zero values) can lead the process coming 
out of the chaotic attractor. After that, the system state typically directs to a certain 
constant value or infinity. Thus, we have to exclude some forbidden initial conditions 
and parameters, which yield a short orbit or patterns of behavior after a small 
number of iterations. Figure 4.5 is a plot of the average cycle length verses floating-
point precision. It shows that a high precision does not guarantee a sufficiently long 
trajectory. 
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Figure 4.5: The average and the minimal cycle length of the logistic system (4.4) 
verses floating-point precision obtained from 10 samples of the logistic system. 
Another problem is the sensitivity to floating-point processor implementations. 
Diversified mathematical algorithms or internal precisions in intermediate calcula-
tions can lead to the situation when the same code of an encryption software will 
generate different cryptographic sequences, so there will be no compatibility between 
software environments. 
In Section 3.6 we have mentioned that a chaos-based PRNG with two different 
seeds produces two different sequence with probability 1. This is true for chaotic 
systems with an infinite state space, where the probability Pr (J(Xn) = l(x~)) -t 0 
with Xn -=1= x~ (despite of the fact that 1-1 is multi-valued). In finite-state approxim-
ations, the probability of mapping two points into one is much higher (for example, 
in Figure 4.7 Xn = 0.2 and Xn = 0.8 are mapped to the same point Xn+l ') ' Further-
more, it can occur in each iteration, so that the significant number of trajectories 
will have identical end routes. 
In spite of these shortcomings, a number of investigators have explored the ap-
plications of continuous chaos to digital cryptography. In the following Sections, an 
overview on encryption schemes based on the floating-point approximation of chaos 
is given. 
CHAPTER 4. PSEUDO-CHAOTIC CRYPTOSYSTEMS 71 
4.2.1 Partitioning the State Space 
Floating-point cryptographic systems require a mapping from the plaintext alphabet 
{O, l}m (e.g. 8 bit symbols) to the state space X (e.g. 64 bit floating-point numbers) 
and, sometimes, from the state space to the ciphertext alphabet. A partition can 
be defined by a partitioning function (j : X -t {O, l}m as in symbolic dynamics 
(Section 3.4.1). For example, a simple function for two subsets can be designed by 
taking the last significant bit: 
If a floating-point system is a pseudo-random generator, the function (j must be 
irreversible like a hard-core predicate (Section 3.5.2). This can be archived with an 
equiprobable mapping as suggested in Section 3.6: partitions are selected in such a 
way, that each symbol occurs with the same probability. 
However, it is not obligatory to cover all the state space or assign symbols to 
all partitions. On the contrary, we can change statistical properties of the resulting 
symbolic trajectory by assigning symbols in a particular way. For example, Fig-
ure 4.12 shows a probability distribution of state points in the attractor of a logistic 
system. Choosing regions with almost the same probability mass, we obtain better 
statistics in the output. 
The number of subsets can be increased, for example, up to 4, 8, 16 etc. In this 
case the generator will produce more pseudo-random bits per iteration (m = 2,3,4). 
Clearly, increasing m reduces the cryptographic strength of the generator since it 
becomes easier to invert (j. 
4.2.2 Chebyshev Map 
In 1983 Erber et al. [41] suggested using a Chebyshev mixing polynomial to simulate 
a random process on digital computers. The polynomial is given by 
Xn+l = x; - 2, Xn E (-2,2) . (4.2) 
The sequence Xo, Xl, X2, ... is chaotic, however, some particular values for Xn must 
be avoided (xn =1= -1,0,1). With a non-integral seed Xo, it is theoretically expected 
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Figure 4.6: The empirical Cumulative Distribution Function of a sequence generated 
with the Chebyshev system before (doted line) and after (solid line) the additional 
transformation (4.3). The straight line looks like the uniform distribution on (-2, 2). 
that these values will never be encountered. A system with 40-bit precision provides 
an average cycle of 105 steps [86]. 
The output Yn is obtained after an additional nonlinear transformation 
4 (Xn ) Yn = ;: arccos "2 - 2. ( 4.3) 
This additional transformation attempts to improve the statistical properties of the 
sequence, which has a particular probability distribution (the same as for the logistic 
map given in Figure 4.12). 
By applying a transformation with the same shape as the Cumulative Distribu-
tion Function (CDF) Pr(xn < x) of the input sequence, one can obtain a uniform-like 
CDF of the output (Figure 4.6). However, the transformation does not affect the 
order of elements, so the Chebyshev sequence is highly correlated. 
So far, several investigators (Hosack [59], for example) have found that the 
Chebyshev transformation possesses undesirable qualities which make it unsuitable 
for pseudo-random number generation. 
4.2.3 Logistic Map 
A similar transformation has become of the most famous chaotic maps. In 1976, 
Mitchell Feigenbaum studied the complex behavior of the so-called logistic map 
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Figure 4.7: The logistic map for r = 0.99. 
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Figure 4.8: A chaotic sequence generated with the logistic map for Xo = 0.34 and 
r = 0.99. 
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Figure 4.9: Bifurcation of the logistic map. The most 'unpredictable' behavior 
occurs when r -+ 1. 
fIx. r)=( r'\)f( \/r'\ )Arlxl( \-x)Ar 
Figure 4.10: Attractor points corresponding to different values of the parameter r 
in the Matthews map. 
(Figure 4.7) 
( 4.4) 
where x E (0,1) and r E (0,1). 
For any long sequence of N numbers generated from the seed Xo we can calculate 
the Lyapunov exponent given by 
1 N 
A (xo) = N I)og Ir (1- 2xn )l· 
n=l 
For example, the numerical estimation for r = 0.9 and N = 4000 is A (0.5) ~ 0.7095. 
With certain values of the parameter r, the generator delivers a sequence, which 
appears pseudo-random (Figure 4.8). The Freigenbaum cascade (Figure 4.9) shows 
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Figure 4.11: The analytical solution at n = 5 of the logistic map for r = 1. 
the values of Xn on the attractor for each value of the parameter r. As r increases, the 
number of points in the attractor increases from 1 to 2, 4, 8 and infinity. In this area 
(r -. 1) it was considered difficult to estimate the final state of the system (without 
performing n iterations) given initial conditions xo, or vice-versa - to recover Xo 
(which can be a key or a plaintext) from X n • This complexity was regarded as a 
fundamental advantage in using continuous chaos for cryptography. 
For the boundary value of the control parameter r = 1 the analytical solution 
[62, 51J is: 
Xn = sin2 (2n arcsin yXO) . (4.5) 
When n = 1 we have the initial equation (4.4). 
Hence, the state Xn can be computed directly from Xo (without performing n 
iterations). Figure 4.11 gives the solution for X5 = j5 (xo). The number of spikes 
increases with n, illustrating the sensitivity to the initial conditions. A discussion 
on the analytical solution is presented in Section 4.2.8. 
Bianco et al. [25J used the logistic map (4.4) to generate a sequence of floating 
point numbers, which is then converted into a binary sequence. The binary sequence 
is XOR-ed with the plaintext, as in the one-time pad cipher (see Section 2.1.3). 
The parameter r together with the initial condition Xo form a secret key. The 
conversion from floating point numbers to binary values is done by choosing two 
disjoint interval ranges representing 0 and 1. The ranges are selected in such a way, 
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Figure 4.12: The Probability Density Function of a state sequence produced by the 
logistic system with an incomplete partition. 
that the probabilities of occurrence of 0 and 1 are equal (as illustrated in Figure 4.12). 
Note, the equiprobable mapping does not ensure the uniform distribution. Though 
the numbers of zeros and ones are equal, the order is not random. 
It has been pointed out by Wheeler [99] and Jackson [61] that computer imple-
mentations of chaotic systems yield surprisingly different behavior, i.e. it produces 
very short cycles and trivial patterns (a numeric example in this thesis is given in 
Figure 4.5). 
Matthews [76] generalizes the logistic map with cryptographic constraints and 
develops a new map to generate a sequence of pseudo-random numbers 
Xn+1 = (r + 1) (~ + 1) r . Xn (1 - xnf ,r E (1,4) . 
The Matthews system exhibits chaotic behavior for parameter values within an 
extended range (Figure 4.10) extending the key space. However, no robust crypto-
graphic system was created due to the general floating-point problems, mentioned 
above. 
4.2.4 Tent Map 
The one-dimension tent map is defined as 
{
a' X n , 
Xn+1 = 1-x n 
1-a ' 
o ::; Xn ::; a 
a < Xn ::; 1 
(4.6) 
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Figure 4.13: The tent map. 
where the parameter a determines the top of the tent (Figure 4.13). 
The Lyapunov exponent depends on the parameter a and is given by >. (a) = 
-a In (a) - (1 - a) In (1 - a) for almost all Xo E (0,1) [71]. 
Numerically, max>. (a) ~ 0.693 at a = 0.5. 
aE(O,l) 
The tent map has an analytical solution (again, only for a = 0.5) given by 
1 Xn = - arccos (cos 2n1TXo) . 
1T 
(4.7) 
Habutsu et al. [53] suggested a chaos-based block encryption system (Figure 
2.3) in which the inverse of the one-dimensional tent map (4.6) is applied N = 75 
times to an initial condition representing the plaintext. The 64-bit plaintext is 
encrypted into 147-bit ciphertext (Figure 2.3). A combination of a floating-point 
number a E [0.4,0.6] and a binary sequence r = {r n} nE[l,N] is the secret key. The 
map can be written as 
(a - 1) Xn + 1, rn = 1 n E [l,N]. ( 4.8) 
where ri E {ri}f' and a E [OA,0.6]. For N inverse iterations there are 2N possible 
ciphertexts which encode the same plaintext. 
Biham [24] pointed out that the cryptosystem could be easily broken using a 
chosen ciphertext type of attack; the complexity of a known plain-text type of 
attack is 238 • 
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Figure 4.14: The Gallagher map. 
4.2.5 Other Chaotic Maps 
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Gallagher et el. [49J developed a chaotic stream cipher, based on the transformation 
(Figure 4.14) 
x E (0, 10) , a E [0.29, 0.40J . 
Both the initial condition Xo and the parameter a represent the key. After no = 
200 iterations, the system encrypts the plaintext byte PI into the ciphertext float 
CI = r O+n1 (xo), i.e. the chaotic map is applied PI E [0,255J times. Subsequent 
plaintexts are encrypted using the same trajectory (Figure 2.4-c): 
Clearly, disadvantages of such an encryption scheme are: (i) the data expansion 
(the floating-point representation of Ci is considerably larger that the source byte 
Pi) and (ii) unstable cycles, incident to floating-point chaos generators. 
Kotulski [69J proposes a two dimensional map matching the reflection law of 
a geometric square and defines conditions under which the system is chaotic and 
mixing. 
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There are, in principle, an unlimited number of iterated functions available to 
generate cryptographic sequences and the nonlinear transformation can be more 
complex, for example, 
f (x) = rx (1 -tan (~X) ) , 
f (x) = rx (1 -log (1 + x)). 
(4.9) 
(4.10) 
Though each system has a particular state distribution in the phase space, qual-
itatively, its behavior is similar to a basic chaotic system such a logistic map. 
To increase unpredictability (Le. the number of states, nonlinearity, complexity) 
high-order multi-dimensional chaotic system can be used. For example, Paar [SO] 
suggests a second order differential equation describing a robot model 
which corresponds to a hard spring with coefficients 021 and 023 with two types 
of friction. The right side of the equation represents a periodic time-dependent 
force with the amplitude L (w5l21l") and a feedback force given by the corresponding 
parameters. 
To date, no such systems have been implemented as a working encryption al-
gorithm (at least no algorithm is known to the author). This is principally due 
to the relatively complex numerical integration schemes that are required and the 
non-uniform distribution of state variables. 
4.2.6 Multi-Stream Generators 
Protopopescu [S2] proposes an encryption scheme based on multiple iterated func-
tions: m different chaotic maps are initialized using a secret key. If the maps depend 
on parameters, these too are determined by the key. The maps are iterated using 
floating point arithmetic and m bytes are extracted from their floating point repres-
entations, one byte from each map. These m numbers are then combined using an 
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Figure 4.15: A multi-stream cryptographic generator 
XOR operation. The process is repeated to create a one time pad which is finally 
XOR-ed with the plain-text. 
In this thesis, we extend the Protopopescu scheme as follows: 
1. Chaotic systems can be connected to each other (Le. the state of each system 
influences the states of all other systems) to increase the average orbit length. 
Linked systems form a single chaotic system with a large state space and more 
stable orbits. A connection between chaotic systems may be established at a 
given time interval. 
2. The set of chaotic systems (iterated functions) can be different for each en-
cryption session. This can be implemented by supplying an iterated function 
set with the key. 
3. The output bit can be generated in each q-th iteration. This increases the 
independence of bits as suggested in Section 3.6. 
4. Chaotic systems can be permuted in a complex manner, particulary, the order 
of 'switching on' the systems may depend on the key (Figure 4.15). 
We can define this extended cryptographic system as 
x~+1 = !I (x;, kl), 
x;+1 = h(x;, k2), 
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bj = bJ EB b; EB ... EB bj, 
where 
ft, 12,··· , fm are iterated functions of the session set 
(xA, kl, x~, k2 , ••• , xo, km) are initial conditions; bJ, b;, ... bj are the internal state 
bits in (n = qj)-th moment of time; bj is the generator output. 
A mixing component providing the property (1) is given by 
A pseudo-random generator based on multiple chaotic systems with extended 
properties (1) - (3) (see page 80) has been implemented in this thesis and forms the 
basis of the software system E-Larm (see Chapter 5). 
For m = 4 and q > 15 the output sequence is statistically close to a random 
sequence. Nevertheless, compared with traditional generators, this solution is rather 
cumbersome and inefficient. It attempts to solve the problems related to the floating-
point arithmetic in a 'extensive' way, providing (m - 1) redundant systems (in case 
one or more systems generate short orbits). 
4.2.7 Iteration Counting Ciphers 
Baptista [22J and Wong [103] propose a few encryption methods in which the cipher-
text is the number of iterations. The state space X of a chaotic system is partitioned 
into m disjoint regions {Xl, X2 , •.. , Xm} (covering the entire X or, possibly, part of 
it). A unique plaintext symbol P is assigned to each region. Seeded with an ini-
tial condition (xo, control parameters), the system performs no iterations. All the 
plaintexts are then encrypted into a sequence of integers 
Ci = ni - ni-b i = 1,2, . .. , 
where ni is the number of iterations such as the plaintext Pi = (J (Xi) and r i E Xi. 
Figure 2.4-b shows the concept of iteration counting ciphers. This encryption scheme 
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can be extended with a pseudo-random nmin, generated for each plaintext symbol. 
The integer nmin defines the minimal number of iteration the system should perform 
before encrypting the next symbol. Clearly, the disadvantages are: (i) a probability 
of overflowing the counter Ci = ni - ni-l (i.e. the length of a trajectory segment 
can be larger then the maximal number fitting the fixed-length ciphertext Ci); (ii) 
the ciphertext being larger than the plaintext; (iii) lots of redundant cycles when a 
long orbit occurs. 
Ho [57] continued the research of Baptista and Wong, and went on to develop a 
software implementation of the encryption techniques, performance evaluation and 
cryptanalysis. Ho suggests using 4 plaintext bit blocks to speed up the cryptographic 
algorithm. However, this increases ciphertext redundancy - 4 bits of plaintext 
are encrypted into a 10 bit ciphertext block. Ho discusses various chaos-specific 
cryptography issues - dynamic mapping from plaintext to floating-point state, 
trajectory distribution and algorithm complexity. 
4.2.8 Multi-valued Chaotic Maps 
with Analytical Solutions 
A solvable system has an analytical solution of each trajectory, i.e. for any discrete 
moment of time n we can calculate the state Xn from the initial condition Xo (without 
performing n iterations). We have already considered analytical solutions for the 
logistic (Section 4.2.3) and the tent (Section 4.2.4) systems. 
Clearly, an analytical solution of a dynamic system is important in simulation 
sciences since it eliminates the rounding accumulation problem and speeds up com-
putations. Figure 4.4 gives two trajectories of the logistic system computed using 
the iterated function (4.4) and the analytical solution (4.5). A special class of solv-
able systems is very interesting for cryptographic applications. These are one-step 
unpredictable solvable systems, described by Gonzalez et al. [51]. 
All known solutions for a chaotic system can be written in the general form 
(4.11) 
where 'It (t) is a periodic function with period T, K, is an integer and () is a real 
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Figure 4.16: A multiple valued chaotic map Xn+1 = f(xn) 
parameter defining the initial condition: 
Xo = 'l1 (BT) . 
The system is chaotic if the Lyapunov exponent). = In K, > O. 
Consider a dynamic system with the solution 
Xn = sin2 (7rBK,n). 
The one-step map Xn ~ Xn+1 for this system is given by 
Xn+1 = sin2 (K, arcsin Fn) . 
83 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
Unlike the logistic and the tent equations, the map (4.13) can be multi-valued, 
in particular, when K, is an irrational number. Figure 4.16 shows an undefined set 
of points obtained with the equation 4.12 for K, = 7r1/ 3 . 
On the one hand, analytical solutions provide random access to elements of the 
cryptographic sequence (unlike conventional pseudo-random generators). On the 
other hand, the values of X n-1 and Xn+1 cannot be computed from Xn because of 
the multi-value nature of arcsin in (4.13). So the system is one-step unpredict-
able (provided the adversary cannot computer the seed and/or does not know the 
solution). 
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Figure 4.17: A pseudo-random generator based on an analytic solution. 
The function Xn = w((;I, /'i" n) must have the one-way property to protect the seed 
Xo· The equation 4.12 has infinitely many solutions for (;I and /'i, given Xn. However, 
it is difficult to prove that given a long sequence Xn, Xn+1," . it is computationally 
impossible to recover (;I (or xo) and /'i,. To ensure this, we can introduce a hard-core 
predicate as illustrated in Figure 4.17. 
Unfortunately, analytical solutions have the 'stretch-and-folder' property: first, 
the arguments ((;I, /'i,) are stretched over a large space (by raising in power and 
multiplying), and then are folded by means a periodical function (sin, mod). Con-
sequently, the maximum length and the 'pseudo-random' quality of the sequence 
is limited by the computer precision. As n increases, the effect of an intermedi-
ate rounding in (4.12) becomes more destructive, so solvable systems also have a 
'horizon' of predictability. For large n, the result (in the context of patterns and 
probability distributions) may be even worse than iterative computation. 
Another problem is that we know analytical solutions only for certain (boundary) 
values of control parameters. This does not allow to use parameters as a secret key, 
all the secrecy must be kept in the seed. 
Kotulski et al. [68J studied floating-point implementations of solvable chaotic 
systems (4.13) and found them useful for producing short chaotic sequences (e.g. in 
block ciphers), whereas long sequence did not pass statistical tests. The problem is 
that generators are very sensitive to the choice of seeds and control parameters, i.e. 
not all seeds produce a sufficiently long sequence. 
4.3 Binary Pseudo-Chaos 
Section 2.2.7 provided an introduction to binary chaos, defined by a binary iterated 
function f : 0 --+ 0 and a set of infinite strings O. 
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Cryptographic systems use finite strings and have a limited exponential diver-
gence of trajectories; in our notation, they are pseudo-chaotic. Typically, binary 
pseudo-chaotic systems behaves similarly to chaos during the first iterations (e.g. 
block ciphers, where the number of rounds is, typically, n = 16) until the state is 
truncated. After this, one can discover non-chaotic properties such as periodicity. 
A common definition of the Lyapunov exponent for binary systems (A, 1), over 
a finite state space Am c n is given by 
A (Xo) = lim ..!.logdH(r(xo),r(x~)), 
n-+oo n 
where x~ E A is taken from the neighborhood of x, i.e. dH (xo, x~) = l. 
In a 'good' pseudo-chaotic system of the size 2m, two trajectories beginning at 
adjacent points Xo and x~ diverge, on average, exactly to (dH) = m/2 (Figure 4.3-b). 
Like any finite-state system, a binary pseudo-chaotic system is periodical. For 
example, a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) given by 
with particular coefficients Ci [86] has an ideal trajectory of length 2m . 
4.3.1 RANROT 
Fog [43] introduced a class of pseudo-chaotic number generators, whose cycle lengths 
depend on the initial condition. This class of pseudo-chaotic system (named RAN-
ROT) is similar to additive generators but with extra rotation or swapping of bits. 
For example, 
Xn = ((xn-j + Xn-k) mod 2m) rotrr, 
where Xn E {O, l}m,r E [0,m/2) and j, k are different integers chosen according 
to certain rules. This nonlinear transformation insures exponential divergence at 
the beginning of trajectories and unpredictable behavior if the rotation parameter 
r is unknown. According to the author, the RANROT generators have passed 
all conventional tests of pseudo-randomness and appear to be faster than other 
generators of similar quality. 
To avoid short cycles, Fog suggests making a periodicity test (up to 1000 itera-
tions) before using a cryptographic application. 
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Figure 4.18: The discrete tent map. 
4.3.2 Discrete Tent Map 
Masuda et al. [75] suggest a cryptosystem based on a discretized one-dimension tent 
map 
where A = 1,2, ... , M and LJ , fl are round-down and round-up respectively. An 
initial condition is the plaintext; the final state is the ciphertext and a single para-
meter is the key. The chaotic map is applied sufficiently many times. The author 
discusses such properties as the correlation between invariant measures of plaintexts 
and ciphertexts. Sufficient conditions are given under which the cipher is resistant 
to differential and linear analysis. 
4.3.3 Cellular Automata 
Wolfram [102] describes a PRNG based on a one-dimensional cellular automata 
(CA). The system state is defined by a linear array of elements (cells) 
b= (b(1),b(2), ... ,b(n)) E {O,l}n. 
The iterated function f : {O, l}m -+ {O, l}m is given by 
b(i) = b(i) -1 xor (b(i) orb(i + 1)), for all 1 ::::; i ::::; m. 
The array is considered circular i.e b (m + 1) = b (1), and the new element val-
ues are considered to be updated in parallel. The output is taken from one cell 
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Figure 4.19: A stretch-and-fold baker transformation. 
bk , k E [0, n] only. This particular CA method requires three array-access opera-
tions plus two logical operations for each element of the array. While fairly simple 
to implement in hardware (since hardware may perform each cell computation in 
parallel), a large CA system may involve more computations than desired for a 
software implementation using a single CPU [86]. 
Gutowitz [52] suggests a complex scheme using a cellular automata. A 512-bit 
plaintext block is encrypted into a slightly larger ciphertext (578 bits). A two part 
key (1088-bit) is used for a particular encryption scheme with a so-called block-link 
structure. There are two rounds, each round consists of two subrounds and each 
subround includes substitution and permutation phases. The author expects that a 
sufficient number of rounds ensures a distribution that is statistically close to that of 
a random process and shows that the cipher is resistant to differential cryptanalysis. 
4.3.4 Generalized Baker Map 
A generalized Baker map, also known as Kolmogorov flows, represents the most 
unstable class of chaotic systems, which can be particularly useful for mixing two 
dimensional data blocks. The iterated function Tp can be considered as a geometrical 
transformation of a square image: the image is divided into vertical strips according 
to a partition set p = {nl' n2, ... , nd, stretched horizontally and folded vertically as 
illustrated in Figure 4.19. 
A discrete interpretation of the Baker map based on modular calculus is invert-
ible. The iterated function Tp is defined on a finite matrix: 
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Figure 4.20: Six Baker transformations at p = {0.25, 0.5, 0.25} applied to Lenna 
[89]. 
The set {nl' n2, ... , nd is chosen in such a way that each integer ni divides Nand 
nl + n2 + ... + nk = N. The bit b,·,s E {O, l}N is mapped to a new position given by 
( N N ni ( N)) Tp (T, s) = - (T - Ni) + s mod - , N s - s mod - + Ni , ni ni ni 
where T, s E {I, 2, ... , N}, Ni = nl +n2+ ... +ni, i E {I, 2, ... , k} and Ni ::; T < Ni+ni. 
Clearly, this discrete version of the transformation becomes a key-dependent cyclic 
permutation. 
Scharinger [89] and Fridrich [45] describe chaotic block ciphers based on dis-
crete Kolmogorov flows. The technique appears to be highly efficient since large 
matrices can be permuted in bulk and relatively few iterations scramble the input 
object to unrecognizable form (Figure 4.20). However, this transformation should 
be used in combination with a substitution phase, since no permutation can change 
the statistical properties of the plaintext. With a simple modular addition, Fridrich 
extends the transformation to three dimensions. The last 3D transformation is a 
good substitution cipher, which produces ciphertext with a uniform histogram in 
a few iterations. The diffusion phase is implemented with a LFSR. The resulting 
encryption scheme is evaluated in terms of resistance to the general classes of at-
tacks, and no cryptographic weakness is found. Cappelletti [32] designed a hardware 
implementation (using FPGA) of the Scharinger's scheme. 
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Figure 4.21: A typical block cipher is a combination of several pseudo-chaotic sys-
tems 
4.3.5 Pseudo-Chaos and Conventional Cryptosystems 
Pseudo-Random Generators 
Existing pseudo-random generators can be viewed as pseudo-chaotic systems as 
illustrated in Section 3.6. Another example is the Blum-Blum-Shub system [77, 86] 
given by the iterated function 
Xn+l = x; mod M, 
where M = pq, p, q are two distinct prime numbers each congruent to 3 modulo 4. 
The output bit bn is obtained from a predicate O'(xn), which is the last significant 
bit of X n . 
Besides the sensitivity to the initial condition and the topological transitivity, 
a pseudo-random generator has to be computationally unpredictable. The last 
property is ensured by a one-way iterated function and a hard-core predicate (Sec-
tion 3.5.2). A one-way transformation is based on a certain mathematical problem, 
which is considered unsolved. For example, the Blum-Blum-Shub function works 
under the assumption that integer factorization is intractable. 
Chaos theory is not focused on the algorithmic complexity of the iterated func-
tion, whereas in cryptography the complexity is the key issue, i.e. security. 
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Symmetric Block Ciphers 
All classical iterative block ciphers, in our notation, are pseudo-chaos or combina-
tions of several pseudo-chaotic systems. As an example, consider the new Rijndael 
algorithm [84] accepted as AES2. The system state x is a two-dimensional array of 
bits. The plaintext is assigned to the initial conditions Xo, and after a fixed number 
of iterations (n = 10 ... 14), the ciphertext is obtained from the final state xn . The 
encryption transformation is a combination of several pseudo-chaotic maps: 
1. the substitution phase is a composition of multiplicative inverse and affine 
transformations; 
2. the mixing phase includes cycle shifts and column multiplication over a finite 
field; 
3. the round key is obtained from another pseudo-chaotic system (pseudo-random 
generator) . 
If we consider the substitution and mixing phases as a single iterated function, the 
encryption scheme will represent two linked pseudo-chaotic systems (Figure 4.21). 
2The Advanced Encryption Standard is an encryption algorithm for securing sensitive but 
unclassified material by US Government agencies and, as a likely consequence, may eventually 
become the de facto encryption standard for commercial transactions in the private sector. 
Chapter 5 
E-Larm: A Chaos Based 
Encryption System 
5.1 Overview 
E-Larm is a cryptographic tool designed to evaluate chaos-based algorithms. It 
allows the generation of pseudo-chaotic sequences from a floating-point seed as well 
as encrypting and decrypting binary files. E-Larm provides an implementation of 
a multi-stream generator as described in Section 4.2.6. The encryption scheme 
is a sample Vernam cipher (Section 2.1.3) using a pseudo-chaotic sequence as the 
keystream. The software is given on the CD in Appendix A. 
The analysis of the output (pseudo-chaotic sequences, ciphertext) is undertaken 
in mathematical packages such as Matlab 6 and Statistica 6 as well as statistical 
test suite developed by NIST [88]. 
5.2 Algorithm 
The basic idea of this generator is to extract bits from multiple pseudo-chaotic 
systems in a complex and key-dependent manner. E-Larm code contains a set of 
one-dimensional iterated functions f : X -t X, all producing chaos on a certain 
domain (typically, (0,1)). The number of iterated function used in the same session 
is Ns = 4. Examples of the functions are given below (their properties are assessed 
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in Chapter 6): 
1. Smooth nonlinear functions 
• Logistic map Xn+1 = pxn(1 - xn), p = 3.9 
• Sine map Xn+1 = I sin(p7rxn) I, p = 5.0 
• Tangent-feedback map xn+l = 3.3xn(1- tan(1/2xn )) 
• Logarithm-feedback map Xn+1 = px - n(1 -log(1 + xn)), P = 5.0 
2. Piecewise-linear functions 
• Tent map Xn+l = 1 -12xn - 11 
• Sawteeth map xn+1 = 5x mod 4 
For each iterated function we define a 2-region partitioning function part: X ~ 
{0,1} (section 3.4.1) in such a way that the state point spends, on average, equal 
periods of time in each region. If the state point does not belong to any region, 
the function part returns -1. Practically, part can be defined using one of two 
approaches: 
1. Last Significant Bits (LSB) 
The function part extracts one or more last significant bits from the floating 
point format of the state variable x. Then the bits can be combined into one 
output bit, for example, using the XOR-operator. The E-Larm implementa-
tion of part extracts two last bits (for certain maps the single bit has biased 
statistics because of the rounding): 
part(x) = (xand1)xor ((xxor2)>> 1), 
where» is the right shift. This approach is very efficient, especially when the 
state space is non-uniform (e.g logistic, sine, logarithm, tangent maps) because 
the space is partitioned into a large number of regions lying on the resolution 
grid. If an area of the state space has a higher probability mass, then it is 
equally distributed among small regions covering this area. 
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2. Threshold Partitioning (P2) 
The second approach is to divide the state space into two large compact re-
gions. The boundary values are selected using the symmetry of the probability 
density function of the system states (e.g. Figure 4.12). Symbolically, that is 
{ 
0, 
part(x) = 1, 
-1, 
X~in ~ X ~ X~ax 
X:nin ~ x ~ X:nax , 
otherwise 
where [X~in' X~axl U [X:nin' X:naxl C (0,1) and 
[X~in' X~axl n [X:nin, X:naxl = 0. If X~ax = X:nin = Xthres; we then have 
a simple threshold partitioning, or, in other words, first significant bit parti-
tioning. Practically, this approach is more efficient for piecewise-linear maps, 
such as the tent or sawteeth maps, because their floating point approximation 
produces patterns in the last significant bits. 
The following table describes variables and functions referenced in the algorithm. 
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Built-in Variables & Functions 
Ns 
MAXiter 
func [Ns] 
part [Ns] 
mix 
int 
int 
func [] 
func [] 
func 
Input Variables 
L 
pENs] 
seed[Ns] 
MINiter 
int 
int [] 
double [] 
int 
Output Variables 
out [L] byte 
Internal Variables 
s int 
i int 
j int 
state [Ns] double [] 
b byte 
number of the pseudo-chaotic systems 
minimal and maximal number of inter-
mediate states 
set of iterated functions of the form 
state[s] = func(state[s], param[s]) 
set of partitioning functions of the form 
b = func(state[s]) 
mixing function of the form 
state[s] = mixes) 
length of the output sequence 
parameters of the systems 
initial states 
minimal number of intermediate states 
the output sequence 
counter of the systems 
counter of output symbols 
counter of intermediate states 
'current states of the systems 
bit produced by a pseudo-chaotic sys-
tem 
Algorithm 5.1 describes a basic version of the E-Larm generator in a pseudo-
code. The generator produces a binary sequence out [L]. A combination of initial 
states seed [], control parameters p [] and MINi ter may be used as a secret key 
(generator seed). However, the values should be chosen from an appropriate range 
for each system. 
A minimal number of chaotic iterations MINi ter per round is defined to con-
trol the dependence of bits in the output sequence (see asymptotic independence in 
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Section 3.6). To avoid the short cycles, at least at some degree, we suggest to mix 
periodically the states of pseudo-chaotic systems used. In E-Larm, the function mix 
is applied to the state of the s-th system, setting an influence of all systems on the 
current system: 
mix(s) ~ (state[s] ,~J;:.,,,. state[q]) mod 1, 
i.e. the system state is multiplied by the sum of other system states, and the 
fractional part of the result is taken. 
The upper limit MAXi ter is necessary to treat 'bad trajectories' that come out 
of the chaotic attractor due to floating-point rounding. In this case the function 
part becomes -1 for all subsequent iterations and we reset the system with the mix 
function. 
Typical values of parameters are given below: 
Ns = 4 MINiter = 10 MAXiter = 20 
5.3 Practical Implementation 
5.3.1 Platform 
The software platform of E-Larm is Java 2 version 1.4. The choice of platform was 
determined by the following: 
• Java ensures portability of cryptographic algorithms using floating-point arith-
metic. The class StrictMath contains methods for performing basic numeric 
operations such as the elementary exponential and trigonometric functions 
independently from the hardware architecture . 
• Java is the most advanced developing tool of cryptographic applications. The 
Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) provides a framework and implementa-
tions for encryption, key generation and other algorithms. 
5.3.2 User Interface 
E-Larm has both a command line and graphical interface: 
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Algorithm 5.1: Multi-Stream Pseudo-Chaotic Generator 
II Initialization 
for ( s = 0 ; s < Ns ; s = s + 1 ) 
staters] = seed[s] 
end for 
II Main cycle 
for ( i = 0 ; i < L i = i + 1 ) 
II for each system 
II assign the initial condition to 
II the state variable 
II for each output bit 
for ( s = 0 s < Ns ; s = s + 1 ) 
staters] = mixes); 
II for 
II mix 
each system 
the s-th system statef 
for ( j = 0 ; j < MINiter j j 
staters] = func[s]( staters]. 
end for 
+ 1 ) II iterate MINiter times 
do 
staters] = func[s]( 
if ( j > MAXiter ) 
state [s] = 1 
p [s] ) II evaluate the chaotic map 
staters]. p[s]) II evaluate the chaotic map 
II bad trajectory? 
II assign 1 to produce a nonzero mix seed 
state [s] = mixes) II reset the system with a mix seed 
end if 
b = parte staters] ) II obtain a bit using a partitioning 
j = j + 1 II increase the counter 
while ( b == -1 ) II loop until the state point returns 
II to the working domain or 
II the counter j exceed MAXiter 
out[i] = (out[i] + b) mod 2 II append XOR'ed bits coming from 
II the systems to the output string 
end for 
end for 
functj 
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Figure 5.1: E-Larm CUI 
• In command line mode, the application accepts up to 3 arguments: 
java ElarmDemo [InputFileName [OutputFileName [SessionName]]] 
E-Larm encrypts (decrypts) the file InputFileName into InputFileName us-
ing session SessionName. If the extension of InputFileName is different from 
ela, the software performs encryption, otherwise (if the input file extension is 
ela) it performs decryption. If the number of arguments is less than 3, the 
graphical user interface is lunched and initialized with arguments, if given . 
• E-Larm has a graphical user interface based on the class library j avax. swing . * 
(Figure 5.1). Input and output files can be entered manually or by means of 
a file browser (Browse .. . ). Push button Encrypt (Decrypt) activates a sep-
arate thread performing the cryptographic transformation. The tread can be 
stopped with the button Cancel. 
Additionally, one can save a pseudo-random sequence to a binary file, gener-
ated from the current session by choosing Test --t Generate Session ... 
5.3.3 Sessions 
An encryption (decryption) session describes a set of pseudo-chaotic systems used 
by the multi-stream generator. For each iterated function we define initial con-
ditions (seed), control parameters and algorithm parameters (minimal number of 
iterations and a partitioning function). Session defines the environment in which 
the cryptographic sequence is produced and can be considered as a key. 
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The following table defines session variables and their data types used by E-Larm: 
Properties of session 
id int, 
[1,215] 
ID of the session 
name char [255] name of the session 
Properties of i terfunc 
id int, 
[1,215] 
seed double, 
[0,1] 
miniter int, 
[1,104] 
lowerbound. double, 
upperbound [0,1] 
ID of the iterated function 
the initial condition of the it-
erated function 
minimal number of intermedi-
ate iterations time 
lower and upper bounds of a 
state space subset from which 
a cryptographic sequence a 
produced. These paramet-
ers define the partitioning 
function part: the interval 
[lowerbound. upperbound] 
is equally divided in two 
region corresponding to logical 
° and 1. This parameters are 
ignored if the LSB partitioning 
function is used. 
For the purpose of the usability, sessions are stored in the XML format as il-
lustrated below. Once the E-Larm application is started, sessions are loaded from 
conf/sessions. xml and becomes available in the Session combo box (Figure 5.1). 
The Refresh button causes the sessions to be reloaded from the file. 
CHAPTER 5. E-LARM: A CHAOS BASED ENCRYPTION SYSTEM 99 
Source 5.1: An XML session file 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!-- Elarm Session Keys --> 
<!DOCTYPE sessions SYSTEM "sessions.dtd"> 
<sessions> 
<session id="l" name="Test Session 01"> 
<iterfunc id="l" seed="0.26" miniter="10" 
lowerbound="0.2" upperbound="O.8"/> 
<iterfunc id="2" seed="0.33" miniter="12" 
lowerbound="0.18" upperbound="0.9"/> 
<iterfunc id="3" seed="0.745" miniter="8" 
lowerbound="0.6" upperbound="l"/> 
</session> 
<session id="2" name="Test Session 02"> 
<iterfunc id="2" seed="0.87" miniter="12" 
lowerbound="0.18" upperbound="0.9"/> 
<iterfunc id="3" seed="0.61" miniter="8" 
lowerbound="0.6" upperbound="l"/> 
<iterfunc id="4" seed="0.589" miniter="10" 
lowerbound="0.25" upperbound="0.8"/> 
</session> 
</sessions> 
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5.4 Initial Conditions and Parameters 
Chaotic generators are sensitive to the choice of initial conditions and parameters. If 
the initial condition Xo does not belong the chaotic (strange) attractor, the system 
can reach a point attractor or periodic attractor, and start generating a trivial 
sequence. It is important to ensure that the control parameters correspond a chaotic 
behaviour. 
In E-Larm the range for the initial condition Xo and the value of parameter p 
were defined in the following way: 
• For well known chaotic map (logistic, sine, tent, sawteeth maps), the values 
were taken to guarantee most unstable mode as described in the literature 
(e.g. [81], [20]) . 
• Original chaotic functions (tangent, logarithm) were assigned parameters by 
studying these functions analytically and by carrying simulations in Matlab. 
In particular, histograms (PDF of the state space) were studied at different 
control parameters (histogram plots are given in Section 6.5). 
Following is a list of iterated functions with initial conditions and control para-
meters used by E-Larm. Initial conditions (seed) are defined in the session file 
(Section 5.3.3), whereas control parameters are built in the application (i. e. defined 
in the source code). 
Table 5.1: Continuous nonlinear maps 
Name Equation Params Init. Condo 
Logistic map Xn+! = PXn(1- Xn) P = 3.99 xoE(O,l) 
Sine map Xn+! = I sin (P7rXn) I p= 5.0 Xo E (0,1) 
Tangent-feedback map Xn+1 = PXn(1- tan(0.5xn)) p= 3.3 Xo E (0.5,1.5) 
Logarithm-feedback map Xn+! = pxn(l -log(l + Xn)) p= 5.0 Xo E (0.3,1.5) 
Exactly solvable map Xn = sin2(7re~n) ~ = 7r1/ 3 xo=(O,l) 
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Table 5.2: Piecewise-linear maps 
Name Equation Params Init. Condo 
Tent map Xn+1 = 1 - Ipxn - 11 p=2 Xo E (0,1) 
Sawteeth map xn+1 = p/qxn mod q p = 5, q = 4 Xo E (0,1) 
5.5 Evaluation 
Pseudo-randomness and performance tests are described in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 
Evaluation of 
Chaos-based PRNG's 
used for E-Larm 
6.1 Introduction 
Various statistical tests [64, 77, 85, 88, 74, 98] can be applied to a given chaotic 
sequence to compare and evaluate it to a truly random sequence (section 3.3.1). The 
likely outcome of statistical tests, when applied to a truly random sequence, is known 
a priori and can be described in probabilistic terms. There are an infinite number of 
possible statistical tests, each assessing the presence or absence of a pattern which, 
if detected, would indicate that the sequence is non-random, but no specific finite 
set of tests is deemed 'complete'. In addition, the results of statistical testing must 
be interpreted with some care and caution to avoid incorrect conclusions about a 
specific generator. 
In this research we borrow the test methodology described in [88]. A classical 
statistical test is formulated to test a specific null hypothesis Ho. Let the null 
hypothesis be that the sequence being tested is random. Associated with this null 
hypothesis is the alternative hypothesis Ha , which is that the sequence is not random. 
For each applied test, a decision or conclusion is derived that accepts or rejects the 
null hypothesis, i.e., whether the generator is (or is not) producing random values, 
102 
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based on the sequence that was produced. 
For each test, a relevant randomness statistic must be chosen and used to de-
termine the acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis. Under an assumption 
of randomness, such a statistic has a distribution of possible values. A theoretical 
reference distribution of this statistic under the null hypothesis is determined by 
mathematical methods. From this reference distribution, a critical value is determ-
ined (typically, this value is 'far out' in the tails of the distribution, say out at the 
99% point). During a test, a test statistic value is computed on the data (the se-
quence being tested). This test statistic value is compared to the critical value. If 
the test statistic value exceeds the critical value, the null hypothesis for random-
ness is rejected. Otherwise, the null hypothesis (the randomness hypothesis) is not 
rejected (Le. the hypothesis is accepted). 
In practice, the reason that statistical hypothesis testing works is that the ref-
erence distribution and the critical value are dependent on and generated under a 
tentative assumption of randomness. If the randomness assumption is, in fact, true 
for the data at hand, then the resulting calculated test statistical value on the data 
will have a very low probability (e.g., 0.01%) of exceeding the critical value. 
On the other hand, if the calculated test statistical value does exceed the critical 
value (Le., if the low probability event does in fact occur), then from a statistical 
hypothesis testing point of view, the low probability event should not occur naturally. 
Therefore, when the calculated test statistical value exceeds the critical value, the 
conclusion is made that the original assumption of randomness is suspect or faulty. 
In this case, statistical hypothesis testing yields the following conclusions: reject Ho 
(randomness) and accept Ha (non-randomness). 
Statistical hypothesis testing is a conclusion-generation procedure that has two 
possible outcomes, either accept Ho (the data is random) or accept Ha (the data is 
non-random). The following table relates the true (unknown) status of the data at 
hand to the conclusion arrived at using the testing procedure: 
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True situation Conclusion 
Accept Ho Accept Ha 
Data is random (Ho is true) No error Type I error 
Data is not random (Ha is true) Type II error No error 
If the data is, in truth, random, then a conclusion to reject the null hypothesis 
(Le., conclude that the data is non-random) will occur a small percentage of the time. 
This conclusion is called a Type I error. If the data is, in truth, non-random, then 
a conclusion to accept the null hypothesis (Le., conclude that the data is actually 
random) is called a Type II error. The conclusions to accept Ho when the data is 
really random, and to reject Ho when the data is non-random, are correct. 
The probability of a Type I error is often called the level of significance of the 
test. This probability can be set prior to a test and is denoted as a (ALPHA). For 
the test, a is the probability that the test will indicate that the sequence is not 
random when it really is random. That is, a sequence appears to have non-random 
properties even when a 'good' generator produced the sequence. Common values of 
a in cryptography are about 0.01. 
The probability of a Type II error is denoted as (3. For the test, (3 is the probab-
ility that the test will indicate that the sequence is random when it is not; that is, a 
'bad' generator produces a sequence that appears to have random properties. Unlike 
a, (3 is not a fixed value. (3 can take on many different values because there are an 
infinite number of ways that a data stream can be non-random, and each different 
way yields a different (3. The calculation of the Type II error (3 is more difficult than 
the calculation of a because of the many possible types of non-randomness. 
One of the primary goals of the following tests is to minimize the probability of 
a Type II error, Le., to minimize the probability of accepting a sequence being pro-
duced by a good generator when the generator was actually bad. The probabilities 
a and (3 are related to each other and to the size N of the tested sequence in such a 
way that if two of them are specified, the third value is automatically determined. 
In practice, we usually select a sample size N and a value for a. Then a critical 
point for a given statistic is selected that will produce the smallest (3. That is, a 
suitable sample size is selected along with an acceptable probability of deciding that 
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a bad generator has produced the sequence when it really is random. Then the 
cutoff point for acceptability is chosen such that the probability of falsely accepting 
a sequence as random has the smallest possible value. 
Each test is based on a calculated test statistic value, which is a function of the 
data. If the test statistic value is S and the critical value is t, then the Type I error 
probability is P(S > tlHo is true) = P(reject HolHo is true), and the Type II error 
probability is P(S ::; tlHo is false) = P(accept HolHo is false). The test statistic is 
used to calculate a P -value that summarizes the strength of the evidence against 
the null hypothesis. For these tests, each P-value is the probability that a perfect 
random number generator would have produced a sequence 'less random' than the 
sequence that was tested, given the kind of non-randomness assessed by the test. 
If a P-value for a test is determined to be equal to 1, then the sequence appears 
to have perfect randomness. A P-value of zero indicates that the sequence appears 
to be completely non-random. A significance level a can be chosen for the tests. 
If P-value ~ a, then the null hypothesis is accepted; i.e., the sequence appears to 
be random. If P-value < a, then the null hypothesis is rejected; i.e., the sequence 
appears to be non-random. The parameter a denotes the probability of the Type I 
error. Typically, a is chosen in the range [0.001,0.01]. 
Most of the tests have the standard normal and the chi-square X2 as reference 
distributions. If the sequence under test is in fact non-random, the calculated test 
statistic will fall in extreme regions of the reference distribution. The standard 
normal or Gaussian distribution 
1 1 (!E.:::E.)2 f(x, /-L, (7) = y'2m;:2e- 2 " 
is used to compare the value of the test statistic obtained from the RNG with 
the expected value of the statistic under the assumption of randomness. The test 
statistic for the standard normal distribution is of the form z = (x - /-L) 1(7, where 
x is the sample test statistic value, and /-L and (72 are the expected value and the 
variance of the test statistic. The X2 distribution is used to compare the goodness-
of-fit of the observed frequencies of a sample measure to the corresponding expected 
frequencies of the hypothesized distribution. The test statistic is of the form X2 = 
I: ((Oi - ei)2 lei) , where 0i and ei are the observed and expected frequencies of 
occurrence of the measure, respectively. 
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6.2 Considerations for 
Randomness and Unpredictability 
The following assumptions are made with respect to random binary sequences to be 
tested: 
Uniformity: At any point in the generation of a sequence of random or pseudoran-
dom bits, the occurrence of a zero or one is equally likely, i.e., the probability 
of each is exactly 1/2. The expected number of zeros (or ones) is N/2. 
Scalability: Any test applicable to a sequence can also be applied to subsequences 
extracted at random. If a sequence is random, then any such extracted sub-
sequence should also be random. Hence, any extracted subsequence should 
pass any test for randomness. 
Consistency: The behavior of a generator must be consistent across initial condi-
tions (seeds). It is inadequate to test a PRNG based on the output from a 
single seed, or a generator on the basis of an output produced from a single 
physical output. 
6.3 Chaotic Maps 
The following tables describe chaotic maps that have been tested. The finite state 
approximation was the 54-bit floating-point format (double). Two different parti-
tioning methods were used: last significant bit (LSB) for continuous nonlinear maps, 
and threshold partitioning (2 regions) for piecewise-linear maps (see sections 5.2 and 
3.4.1). This choice was determined experimentally as will be discussed later. 
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION OF CHAOS-BASED PRNG'S 107 
Table 6.1: Continuous nonlinear maps 
Name Code Equation Params Fig. 
Logistic map par Xn+1 = pxn(1 - Xn) P = 3.99 6.1 
Sine map sin xn+! = I sin (P7l'Xn) I p = 5.0 6.3 
Tangent-feedback map tan xn+! = PXn(1- tan(0.5xn)) p= 3.3 6.4 
Logarithm-feedback map log xn+! = PXn(1-log(1 + Xn)) P = 5.0 6.5 
Exactly solvable map exact sol Xn = sin2(7I'e~n) ~ = 71'1/3 6.9 
Table 6.2: Piecewise-linear maps 
Name Code Equation Params Fig. 
Tent map tent Xn+! = 1 - Ipxn - 11 p=2 6.6 
Sawteeth map saw Xn+! = p/qxn mod q p = 5, q = 4 6.7 
The E-Larm mixing scheme (referenced hereafter as 'combo' system) has been 
tested on 4 pseudo-chaotic systems: logistic, sine, tangent and sawteeth maps. 
6.4 Visual Approaches 
Before starting numeric tests it is helpful to check the PRNG behavior using simple 
plots in different domains: space-time, phase-space and frequency as well as to check 
the time series distribution: 
6.4.1 Phase-Space Diagrams 
Traditionally, a chaotic system is defined by an iterated function of the form Xn+! = 
f(xn} as introduced in section 2.2. Most of chaotic maps, that have been studied, 
are simple and easily predictable (first row in Figures 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 
6.9). However, the IS-round composition Xn+15 = f15(Xn) shows the complexity and 
mixing effect of chaos. Such a multi-round transformation ensures the asymptotic 
independence of the output bits (section 3.6), i.e hides the time series correlations 
and increases the computational unpredictability. 
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION OF CHAOS-BASED PRNG'S 108 
6.4.2 Time series 
The second row in Figures 6.1,6.3 etc depicts a time series and its lOOO-bin histogram 
(approximated probability density function). Visibly, the histograms of the fioating-
point numbers are not fiat, i.e. the system states are not uniformly distributed over 
the state space and, consequently, are predictable. However, histograms of extracted 
bits using a convenient partition method appear to be uniform: 
• In the case of a piecewise linear map (sawteeth, tent maps) the statistical 
result is better when we choose two or more compact non-overlapping regions 
(e.g. using a threshold). Piecewise linear maps can produce time series with 
good randomness in higher order bits, but often keep the last bit(s) unmod-
ified (as illustrated in Figure 6.8), even with control parameters that should 
theoretically guarantee chaos . 
• On the other hand, for a continuous nonlinear map (logistic, sine maps), the 
last significant bit (LSB) method provides more uniform statistics because of a 
rounding effect (Figure 6.2). The LSB method works even when the histogram 
is not symmetric and it is difficult to find two compact partitions where total 
probability masses are equal (e.g. Figures 6.4 and 6.5). 
The time series obtained with an analytical (exact) solution (section 4.2.8) have 
different histograms in the beginning and at the end of the sequence (Figure 6.9) 
because the precision degrades. The last approximated PDF is not continuous, which 
illustrates the rounding and approximating artifacts. The cycle length histogram is 
given in Figure 6.10. 
6.4.3 Power Spectrum 
The spectral density Fourier transform function detects periodic features. The spec-
tral density function (spectrum) is given by 
( 
N/2 ) 2 
Pm = ~ L xnexp(-i21fnm/N) , 
n=-N/2 
where N is the length of the sequence, m is the spatial frequency. 
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It is considered that the spectrum should be uniform and no more than 5% of 
the peaks should surpass the 95% cutoff. Clearly, most of chaotic maps have a non-
un form spectrum of their time series. But, if we drop out k = 15 intermediate states 
(multi-round composition), the new sequence will have a 'more random' spectrum 
(bottom row of Figures 6.1, 6.3 etc). 
6.4.4 Approximated Entropy 
Approximated entropy (APEN) characteristics are based on repeating patterns in 
the string. "For a fixed block length m, APEN(m) measures the logarithmic fre-
quency with which blocks of length m that are close together remain close together 
for blocks augmented by one position. Thus, small values of APEN(m) imply strong 
regularity, or persistence, in a sequence. Alternatively, large values of APEN(m) im-
ply substantial fluctuation, or irregularity" (Pincus and Singer in [88]). In a long 
truly random sequence, one should expect that APEN (m) ~ log 2 ~ 0.6931. 
Figure 6.11 depicts the APEN values for five binary sequences taken from: 
• the binary expansion of 7r = 3.1416 ... , 
• LCG, Linear Congruent Generator, (page 3.6), 
• SHAIG, Secure Hash Algorithm Generator described in FIPS 186 (sha-l), 
• Logistic system (par), 
• Sine system (sin), 
• E-Larm, 4 stream combo (mix). 
The x-axis reflects the number of bits considered in the sequence. The y-axis reflects 
the deficit from maximal irregularity, that is, the difference between the log 2 and the 
observed approximate entropy value. For a fixed sequence length, one can determine 
which sequence appears to be more random. 
For a sequence of 1M bits, (Figure 6.11, upper plot), logistic and sine systems 
appear more random that LCG. On the lower plot (2M bit sequences) both E-Larm 
and SHAIG have higher entropy than the binary extension of 7r. However, for larger 
block sizes, this is not the case [88]. 
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Figure 6.1: Properties of the logistic map 
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6.5 Brief Description of Tests 
There are 16 tests in the NIST statistical package, and 12 of them have been applied 
to analyze pseudo-chaotic sequences. The following is their brief description and 
parameter values used. The test number and code name in teletype is given for 
further reference. 
1 Frequency (monobit) test (frequency) determines whether the number of 
ones and zeros in a sequence are approximately the same as would be expected 
for a truly random sequence. 
2 Frequency test within a block (block-frequency) determines whether 
the frequency of ones in an M-bit block (M = 100) is approximately M /2, as 
would be expected under an assumption of randomness. 
3 Runs test (runs) focuses on the total number of runs in the sequence, where 
a run is an uninterrupted sequence of identical bits. A run of length k consists 
of exactly k identical bits and is bounded before and after with a bit of the 
opposite value. Among all the runs half should be of length 1, a quarter should 
be of length 2, an eighth should be of length 3 and so on (as long as the number 
of runs so indicated exceeds one); for each of these lengths there should be 
equally many runs of zero bits and runs of one bits. 
4 Test for the longest run of ones in a M-bit block (longest-run) determ-
ines whether the length of the longest run of ones within the tested sequence 
is consistent with the length of the longest run of ones that would be expected 
in a random sequence. 
5 Binary Matrix Rank Test (rank) focuses on the rank of disjoint sub-
matrices of the entire sequence. The test checks for linear dependence among 
fixed length substrings of the original sequence. 
6 Spectral Density Test using Discrete Fourier transform (fft) measures 
peak heights in the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of the sequence. The 
intention is to detect whether the number of peaks exceeding the 95% threshold 
is significantly different than 5%. 
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7 Non-overlapping Template Matching Test (nonperiodic-templates) 
measures the number of occurrences of pre-specified target strings. The pur-
pose of this test is to detect generators that produce too many occurrences of 
a given non-periodic (aperiodic) pattern. For this test and for the Overlapping 
Template Matching test, an m = 10 bit window is used to search for a specific 
m-bit pattern. If the pattern is not found, the window slides one bit position. 
If the pattern is found, the window is reset to the bit after the found pattern, 
and the search resumes. 
8 Overlapping Template Matching Test (overlapping-templates) counts 
the number of occurrences of prespecified target strings. Both this test and 
the previous test use an m = 20 bit window to search for a specific m-bit 
pattern. The difference is that when the pattern is found, the window slides 
only one bit before resuming the search. 
9 Maurer's 'Universal Statistical' Test (universal) focuses on the number 
of bits between matching patterns (a measure that is related to the length of 
a compressed sequence). The purpose of the test is to detect whether or not 
the sequence can be significantly compressed without loss of information. A 
significantly compressible sequence is considered to be non-random. 
10 Serial Test (serial) is focused on the frequency of all possible overlapping 
m = 10 bit patterns across the entire sequence. The purpose of this test is 
to determine whether the number of occurrences of the 2m m-bit overlapping 
patterns is approximately the same as would be expected for a random se-
quence. Random sequences have uniformity; that is, every m-bit pattern has 
the same chance of appearing as every other m-bit pattern. 
11 Approximate Entropy Test (apen) As with the Serial test, the focus of this 
test is the frequency of all possible overlapping m-bit patterns across the entire 
sequence. The purpose of the test is to compare the frequency of overlapping 
blocks of two consecutive/adjacent lengths (m and m+ 1) against the expected 
result for a random sequence. 
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The pseudo-chaotic systems, which have been tested, are given below with their 
notation code, number of rounds and length of the sequence generated: 
Iterated Code Number of Length of Fig. 
Function Rounds Sequence 
SHA1G sha-l - 500000 6.12, 
6.13 
Logistic map par 15 500000 6.12, 
6.13 
Logistic map par-bad 1 500000 6.12, 
6.13 
Sine map sin 15 500000 6.12, 
6.13 
Tangent- tan 15 500000 6.14, 
feedback 6.15 
map 
Logarithm- log 15 500000 6.14, 
feedback 6.15 
map 
Sawteeth saw 15 500000 6.14, 
map 6.15 
4 stream mix 16 500000 6.14, 
combo 6.15 
(E-Larm) 
4 stream mix 16 2000000 6.16 
combo 
(E-Larm) 
The following test procedure has been applied to the pseudo-chaotic systems: 
1. Four different seeds were taken from the valid range (See Tables 5.1 and 5.2 on 
page 100) using a standard Java PRNG; the control parameter p was assigned 
a constant as given in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
2. Four pseudo-chaotic sequence of the length N = 500,000 (denoted as T1, T2, 
T3 and T4) were produced by the E-Larm PRNG. 
3. The eleven tests described above were made for each sequence. The test soft-
ware was compiled on a Linux platform from NIST sources [88J. 
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION OF CHAOS-BASED PRNG'S 114 
4. (4 x 11) P-value were obtained and saved in tables (Figures 6.12-6.16). 
5. The average P-value was computed from four values. 
In addition to the standard length N = 500, 000, four long sequences (N = 
2, 000, 000) were generated and tested using the mix system (E-Larm). Following is 
a description of the results given in Figures 6.12-6.16: 
TEST SUMMARY FOR <code> 
ALPHA 
N 
n, T2, T3, T4 
MEAN 
CONCL 
FINAL CONLUSION 
<code> reference a pseudo-chaotic sys-
tem (see the table above) 
Level of significance a 
Length of the sequence 
Tn denotes a P-value column corres-
ponding to the n-th sequence. Four dif-
ferent sequence were tested 
Average P -value 
Test conclusion. The test fails if more 
then one sequence has P -value < a 
The generator is considered pseudo-
random if it passes all the tests 
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Figure 6.2: Properties of the logistic map (cont.) 
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Figure 6.3: Properties of the sine map 
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Figure 6.4: Properties of the tangent-feedback map 
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Figure 6.5: Properties of the logarithm-feedback map 
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Figure 6.6: Properties of the tent map 
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Figure 6.7: Properties of the sawteeth map 
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Figure 6.S: Properties of the sawteeth map (cont.) 
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Figure 6.9: Properties of the exactly solvable map 
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Figure 6.10: Properties of the exactly solvable map (cont.) 
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Figure 6.12: Estimation of P-value for sha-l, par, par-bad, sin 
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Figure 6.13: Estimation of P-value for sha-l, par, par-bad, sin (cant.) 
TEST SUMMARY FOR sha-l ALPHA=0.0100 N=500000 
Tl T2 T3 T4 MEAN 
frequency 0.4955 OK 0.1414 OK 0.2812 OK 0.2123 OK 0.2826 
block-frequency 0.0321 OK 0.8834 OK 0.3829 OK 0.0066 FAILED 0.3263 
runs 0.5417 OK 0.7580 OK 0.2309 OK 0.2258 OK 0.4391 
longest-run 0.0145 OK 0.1075 OK 0.7653 OK 0.3227 OK 0.3025 
rank 0.7088 OK 0.7272 OK 0.5357 OK 0.4314 OK 0.6008 
fft 0.4037 OK 0.2258 OK 0.7831 OK 0.7972 OK 0.5524 
nonperiodic-templates 0.8883 OK 0.6172 OK 0.9729 OK 0.8935 OK 0.8430 
overlapping-templates 0.1275 OK 0.1777 OK 0.8251 OK 0.4092 OK 0.3849 
universal 0.8805 OK 0.6734 OK 0.6067 OK 0.0636 OK 0.5560 
serial 0.4485 OK 0.1478 OK 0.8656 OK 0.3251 OK 0.4467 
apen 0.1425 OK 0.3097 OK 0.8977 OK 0.3057 OK 0.4139 
FINAL CONCLUSION: the generator is pseudo-random 
TEST SUMMARY FOR par ALPHA=0.0100 N=500000 
T1 T2 T3 T4 MEAN 
frequency 0.2382 OK 0.0913 OK 0.9436 OK 0.6509 OK 0.4810 
block-frequency 0.0593 OK 0.4740 OK 0.5685 OK 0.7666 OK 0.4671 
runs 0.2758 OK 0.6723 OK 0.7110 OK 0.5622 OK 0.5553 
longest-run 0.1633 OK 0.4838 OK 0.0514 OK 0.0810 OK 0.1949 
rank 0.9078 OK 0.6305 OK 0.8071 OK 0.2331 OK 0.6446 
fft 0.0318 OK 0.5509 OK 0.7901 OK 0.5819 OK 0.4887 
nonperiodic-templates 0.7034 OK 0.3301 OK 0.4643 OK 0.6623 OK 0.5400 
overlapping-templates 0.7518 OK 0.8890 OK 0.5553 OK 0.0655 OK 0.5654 
universal 0.7357 OK 0.5998 OK 0.2603 OK 0.0552 OK 0.4127 
serial 0.8472 OK 0.1530 OK 0.2282 OK 0.4795 OK 0.4270 
apen 0.0138 OK 0.7627 OK 0.7051 OK 0.7550 OK 0.5591 
FINAL CONCLUSION: the generator is pseudo-random 
TEST SUMMARY FOR par-bad ALPHA=0.0100 N=500000 
T1 T2 T3 T4 MEAN 
frequency 0.8144 OK 0.1746 OK 0.1847 OK 0.7110 OK 0.4712 
block-frequency 1.0000 OK 1.0000 OK 1.0000 OK 1.0000 OK 1.0000 
runs 
longest-run 
rank 
fft 
nonperiodic-templates 
overlapping-templates 
universal 
serial 
0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 
0.0543 OK 0.6882 OK 0.7521 OK 0.0006 FAILED 0.3738 
0.7602 OK 0.3238 OK 0.7001 OK 0.4332 OK 0.5543 
0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 
0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 
0.0936 OK 0.0485 OK 0.1194 OK 0.0012 FAILED 0.0657 
0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 
0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 
apen 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 FAILED 0.0000 
FINAL CONCLUSION: The generator is NOT pseudo-random 
TEST SUMMARY FOR sin ALPHA=0.0100 N=500000 
Tl T2 T3 T4 MEAN 
frequency 0.1094 OK 0.9391 OK 0.7471 OK 0.3595 OK 0.5388 
block-frequency 0.1032 OK 0.1848 OK 0.8700 OK 0.5903 OK 0.4371 
runs 0.5558 OK 0.0510 OK 0.1009 OK 0.9468 OK 0.4136 
longest-run 0.9895 OK 0.8905 OK 0.9523 OK 0.1007 OK 0.7332 
rank 0.6649 OK 0.8253 OK 0.5374 OK 0.1657 OK 0.5483 
fft 0.3636 OK 0.7972 OK 0.7411 OK 0.3446 OK 0.5616 
nonperiodic-templates 0.3484 OK 0.8734 OK 0.0687 OK 0.1330 OK 0.3559 
overlapping-templates 0.4719 OK 0.5722 OK 0.4818 OK 0.8303 OK 0.5891 
universal 0.8035 OK 0.2317 OK 0.1068 OK 0.7345 OK 0.4691 
serial 0.0050 FAILED 0.3522 OK 0.6083 OK 0.5354 OK 0.3752 
apen 0.9168 OK 0.1010 OK 0.3373 OK 0.7041 OK 0.5148 
FINAL CONCLUSION: the generator is pseudo-random 
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Figure 6.14: Estimation of P -value for tan, log, saw, mix 
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Figure 6.15: Estimation of P-value for tan, log,saw,mix (cont.) 
TEST SUMMARY FOR tan ALPHA=O.OlOO N=500000 
T1 T2 T3 T4 MEAN CONCL 
frequency 0.9099 OK 0.6963 OK 0.6942 OK 0.8675 OK 0.7920 OK 
block-frequency 0.6948 OK 0.2550 OK 0.2578 OK 0.3586 OK 0.3915 OK 
runs 0.5227 OK 0.9660 OK 0.9097 OK 0.6187 OK 0.7543 OK 
longest-run 0.1581 OK 0.7639 OK 0.8498 OK 0.0561 OK 0.4570 OK 
rank 0.4731 OK 0.5834 OK 0.4141 OK 0.1683 OK 0.4097 OK 
fft 0.9561 OK 0.6530 OK 0.6202 OK 0.5570 OK 0.6966 OK 
nonperiodic-templates 0.3499 OK 0.6699 OK 0.2840 OK 0.3072 OK 0.4027 OK 
overlapping-templates 0.9012 OK 0.7102 OK 0.5079 OK 0.5283 OK 0.6619 OK 
universal 0.2447 OK 0.8365 OK 0.2141 OK 0.9650 OK 0.5651 OK 
serial 0.6498 OK 0.2003 OK 0.6742 OK 0.9792 OK 0.6259 OK 
apen 0.9047 OK 0.1157 OK 0.1848 OK 0.8380 OK 0.5108 OK 
FINAL CONCLUSION: the generator is pseudo-random 
TEST SUMMARY FOR log ALPHA=O.OlOO N=500000 
T1 T2 T3 T4 MEAN CONCL 
frequency 0.6028 OK 0.8034 OK 0.6529 OK 0.2555 OK 0.5787 OK 
block-frequency 0.7123 OK 0.7516 OK 0.0613 OK 0.4519 OK 0.4943 OK 
runs 0.7748 OK 0.6187 OK 0.8784 OK 0.2528 OK 0.6312 OK 
longest-run 0.7805 OK 0.4734 OK 0.6821 OK 0.6384 OK 0.6436 OK 
rank 0.9996 OK 0.9716 OK 0.6627 OK 0.6443 OK 0.8195 OK 
fft 0.3128 OK 0.4518 OK 0.7972 OK 0.4913 OK 0.5133 OK 
nonperiodic-templates 0.7937 OK 0.7542 OK 0.7406 OK 0.5462 OK 0.7087 OK 
overlapping-templates 0.5094 OK 0.5908 OK 0.3978 OK 0.4794 OK 0.4944 OK 
universal 0.3550 OK 0.6270 OK 0.5082 OK 0.0485 OK 0.3847 OK 
serial 0.4012 OK 0.6486 OK 0.0291 OK 0.2666 OK 0.3364 OK 
apen 0.2599 OK 0.5511 OK 0.5714 OK 0.1427 OK 0.3813 OK 
FINAL CONCLUSION: the generator is pseudo-random 
TEST SUMMARY FOR saw ALPHA=O.OlOO N=500000 
Tl T2 T3 T4 MEAN CONCL 
frequency 0.9122 OK 0.8875 OK 0.1684 OK 0.7386 OK 0.6767 OK 
block-frequency 0.3757 OK 0.8057 OK 0.5660 OK 0.0189 OK 0.4416 OK 
runs 0.1952 OK 0.1033 OK 0.9933 OK 0.3263 OK 0.4045 OK 
longest-run 0.4881 OK 0.8442 OK 0.9170 OK 0.0237 OK 0.5683 OK 
rank 0.6757 OK 0.2403 OK 0.4983 OK 0.3593 OK 0.4434 OK 
fft 0.9561 OK 0.2708 OK 0.9415 OK 0.9415 OK 0.7775 OK 
nonperiodic-templates 0.8957 OK 0.0303 OK 0.7683 OK 0.0330 OK 0.4318 OK 
overlapping-templates 0.4057 OK 0.3595 OK 0.6720 OK 0.0433 OK 0.3701 OK 
universal 0.7838 OK 0.0851 OK 0.6696 OK 0.7601 OK 0.5746 OK 
serial 0.8549 OK 0.4084 OK 0.2025 OK 0.0670 OK 0.3832 OK 
apen 0.3020 OK 0.9217 OK 0.3101 OK 0.2560 OK 0.4475 OK 
FINAL CONCLUSION: the generator is pseudo-random 
TEST SUMMARY FOR mix ALPHA=O.OlOO N=500000 
Tl T2 T3 T4 MEAN CONCL 
frequency 0.7450 OK 0.3942 OK 0.1983 OK 0.0394 OK 0.3442 OK 
block-frequency 0.9304 OK 0.4553 OK 0.7304 OK 0.8473 OK 0.7408 OK 
runs 0.3494 OK 0.1509 OK 0.0394 OK 0.9650 OK 0.3761 OK 
longest-run 0.4450 OK 0.9430 OK 0.6398 OK 0.0134 OK 0.5103 OK 
rank 0.0195 OK 0.4050 OK 0.0902 OK 0.2480 OK 0.1907 OK 
fft 0.6947 OK 0.0394 OK 0.5504 OK 0.7430 OK 0.5068 OK 
nonperiodic-templates 0.2308 OK 0.8101 OK 0.0389 OK 0.9889 OK 0.5172 OK 
overlapping-templates 0.0385 OK 0.0943 OK 0.8429 OK 0.4590 OK 0.3586 OK 
universal 0.9305 OK 0.0503 OK 0.6932 OK 0.4305 OK 0.5261 OK 
serial 0.0954 OK 0.4085 OK 0.7430 OK 0.7102 OK 0.4893 OK 
apen 0.0245 OK 0.0293 OK 0.9045 OK 0.0893 OK 0.2619 OK 
FINAL CONCLUSION: the generator is pseudo-random 
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Figure 6.16: Estimation of P-value for mix (long sequence) 
TEST SUMMARY FOR mix ALPHA=0.0100 N=2000000 
frequency 
block-frequency 
runs 
longest-run 
rank 
fft 
nonperiodic-templates 
overlapping-templates 
universal 
serial 
apen 
T1 T2 
0.0059 FAILED 0.3798 OK 
0.7464 OK 0.7665 OK 
0.4816 OK 0.7801 OK 
0.1057 OK 0.9545 OK 
0.1834 OK 0.2732 OK 
0.0467 OK 0.6729 OK 
0.0845 OK 0.9175 OK 
0.9164 OK 0.4625 OK 
0.3020 OK 0.0858 OK 
0.0000 FAILED 0.0367 OK 
0.6806 OK 0.4030 OK 
FINAL CONCLUSION: the generator is pseudo-random 
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Figure 6.17: Performance evaluation of pseudo-random generators 
6.6 Performance Evaluation 
Figure 6.17 gives run times in milliseconds of different generators: SHA1G, logistic 
system, sawteeth system and E-Larm (4 streams combo). The test was made with 
500K sequences in Java Runtime Environment version 1.4 running on Pentium III 
1 GHz. The time includes the hard-disk output operation. The number of rounds 
(8 or 16) is the number of intermediate iterations between output bit extracting 
and mixing. Floating-point generators, particulary, E-Larm, are very slow versus 
a conventional PRNG (SHA1G). Numerically, the E-Larm algorithm is slower than 
SHA1G by 100-300 fold depending on pseudo-chaotic systems used. 
6.7 Concl us ions 
The E-Larm implementation of a pseudo-chaotic generator has passed major stat-
istical tests and, from the null hypothesis, can be considered pseudo-random. Long-
sequence test (N = 2,000,000) for the mix has shown more failures of sequence 
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION OF CHAOS-BASED PRNG'S 131 
subtests than the basic tests (N = 500,000). Clearly, the statistical tests identify 
more 'non-random' patterns as we increase the length of sequences. It is very likely 
that the tests will fail if we take a sufficiently long sequence (say, N '" 10,000,000). 
No theoretical cause was found to confirm the pseudo-random property because 
of iterative rounding, whose crucial impact was too complex to study analytically. 
Other disadvantages of E-Larm versus conventional PRNG isolate this approach 
from modern cryptographic applications. In particular: 
• The trajectory length is not perfect and not even stable, i.e. the generator has 
random cycles, including very short patterns. No mathematical instrument is 
known to estimate the cycle length and find control parameters to produce 
perfect trajectories, which is not the case for binary generators . 
• Compared with modern PRNG's, the E-Larm implementation is complex and 
inefficient. It requires floating-point processing, float-to-bit transformation 
and other unnecessary time-consuming operations. A floating-point format is 
redundant for the present cryptographic application and the overall perform-
ance is not acceptable. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
7.1 Theory of Chaos based Cryptography 
This thesis has discussed cryptography in the context of chaos theory. Clearly, 
there is a fundamental relationship between the two sciences. In both chaos theory 
and cryptography, the object of study is a dynamic system that performs an iter-
ative nonlinear transformation of information in an apparently unpredictable but 
deterministic manner. In terms of chaos theory, the sensitivity to the initial condi-
tions together the mixing property ensures cryptographic confusion and diffusion, 
as originally suggested by Shannon. 
At the same time, there are conceptual differences: 
• Chaos theory studies dynamic systems defined on an infinite state space (e.g 
vectors of real numbers or infinite binary strings), whereas cryptography relies 
on a finite-state machine (computer). All chaos models implemented on a 
computer are approximations, i. e. pseudo-chaos. 
• Chaos theory studies the asymptotic behavior of a nonlinear system (n -+ 00), 
whereas cryptography focuses on the effect of a small number of iterations 
(n « 00). 
• Chaos theory is not concerned about the algorithmic complexity of the iterated 
function, while in cryptography complexity is the key issue, meaning security. 
In other words, the concepts of cryptographic security and efficiency have no 
132 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 133 
counterparts in chaos theory. However, certain mathematical problems from 
chaos theory can be adopted to cryptography. 
• Classical chaotic systems have visually recognizable attractors, in which the 
dimension is fractional. Cryptography attempts to maximize the attractor 
dimension (to an integer) and to hide any visible structure. Unlike chaos in 
general, cryptographic systems use all combinations of independent variables 
to be most unpredictable for an observer. 
Chaotic systems are algorithmically random and thus cannot be predicted by a 
deterministic Turing machine even with infinite power. However, chaotic systems 
are predictable by a probabilistic Turing machine. Finding probabilistically unpre-
dictable chaotic systems is a central problem for chaos based cryptography. 
A rarefied sample Xk, X2k, ••. Xnk, .•• from a time series XI, X2, X3, . .. , produced 
by a chaotic and mixing system, is asymptotically independent: for any n, elements 
X(n-l)k and Xnk will be more and more independent as k increases. So far, ergodic 
theory explains a confusion mechanism of cryptographic systems (Le. the statistical 
independence between the ciphertext and the plaintext, or between pseudo-random 
numbers). 
Chaotic systems with analytical solutions of the form Xn = 1J! (xo, n) and multi-
valued map Xn+1 = f(xn) can, theoretically, deliver computationally unpredictable 
(pseudo-random) sequences. The advantage of such a generator is the random access, 
i.e. any element Xn can be- computed directly from the initial condition (seed) Xo· 
The cryptographic secrecy is kept in the seed and the solution 1J! (xo, n). 
The properties summarized above relate to infinite state systems (true chaos), 
while cryptographic applications run on finite-state computers. Computer approx-
imations of chaos, called pseudo-chaos do not 'converge' with the original model 
due to the nature of chaos. Therefore, these theoretical results cannot be directly 
applied to practical cryptography. 
In conclusion, we should admit that the impact of chaos theory is quite doubtful. 
On the one hand the synergetic approach identifies common laws driving crypto-
graphic systems and iterative nonlinear transformation, exponential instability and 
other properties. On the other hand, this synergetic knowledge is not enough to 
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design strong cryptographic systems. Neither chaos, nor pseudo-chaos can guaran-
tee pseudo-randomness and resistance to different kinds of cryptanalyses. Chaos 
theory is not related to number theory and the computational complexity that un-
derpin digital cryptography. 
For many years, symmetric ciphers and PRNG's have been deeply studied and do 
not seem to need serious upgrades. By contrast, asymmetric schemes, which modern 
security relies upon, require much more attention; they form the basis for such crucial 
applications as key management and digital signature. However, chaos theory, at 
least in this project, has not brought any new ideas to asymmetric cryptography. 
7.2 Practical Issues 
Floating-point arithmetic is the most obvious solution of approximating continuous 
chaos on a finite-state machine. However, there is no straightforward application to 
pseudo-random number generation and ciphering. Critical problems are (i) grow-
ing rounding-off errors; (ii) the approximated system is not structurally stable, i.e. 
different initial conditions and parameters yield different cryptographic properties, 
such as very short orbits, weak plaintexts or weak keys. These problems have been 
solved in the E-Larm system software (Chapter 5), but in some (insufficient) degree 
only. 
Chaotic systems based on smooth nonlinear functions (e.g. x2 , sin(x), log(x)) 
produce sequences with a highly non-uniform distribution. Clearly, these can be 
predicted by a probabilistic machine. Using the last significant bit (LSB) partition-
ing and multi-round transformation, we obtain a bit sequence with good statistical 
properties. It passes all pseudo-randomness tests, from which we conclude that it is 
pseudo-random. 
Many piecewise-linear maps (e.g. sawteeth, tent map) generate sequences, which 
have theoretically fiat distributions. But in practice, these are even more dangerous 
than nonlinear systems because of the overall effect of linearity, rounding and iterat-
ive transformations. Often, histograms of bit sequences produced by piecewise-linear 
maps, look like a staircase or a large saw. The LSB method does not work (last bits 
display patterns), instead, the output can be produced from first significant bit(s) 
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or using a threshold. 
As shown in Chapter 6, floating-point chaos based cryptosystems, both nonlin-
ear and piecewise-linear are dramatically inefficient when compared to conventional 
PRNG's. Other shortcomings, particulary, the lack of theoretical conviction in their 
pseudo-random property make them unacceptable to modern cryptography. 
All conventional cryptographic systems (encryption schemes, pseudo-random 
generators, hash functions) are binary pseudo-chaotic systems, defined on a finite 
space of strings. Such systems are periodical but have a limited sensitivity to the 
initial conditions, i.e. the Lyapunov exponents are positive only if measured at the 
beginning of the process (before one can see the cycles). The mixing property leads 
to pseudo-randomness. 
Pseudo-chaotic systems have typically many orbits of different length. Measuring 
the minimal, average and maximal length of a system is not a trivial number theory 
problem. Clearly, ideal cryptographic systems have a single orbit that includes all 
the possible states. 
Iterative block ciphers can be viewed as a combination of two linked pseudo-
chaotic systems: data and round-key systems. The iterated function of the data 
system includes: nonlinear substitutions, row shifts, column mixing etc. The round-
key system is a pseudo-random generator providing the sensitive dependence of the 
ciphertext on the key. 
Technically, most of pseudo-random generators are based on the stretch-and-fold 
transformation: first, the state is stretched over a large space (e.g, multiplying or 
raising in power), then folded into the original state space (using a periodical func-
tion such as mod, sin). In mathematical chaos, the stretch-and-fold transformation 
forms the basis of the majority of iterated functions. 
An exact (analytical) solution of a chaotic system has a much stronger stretch-
and-fold property. Consequently, it eliminates the precision problem in some degree 
only: in the beginning, the simulation of chaos is more accurate, but, for long 
sequences the result is even worse than iterative computations. 
Floating-point implementations of analytical solutions do not provide good pseudo-
random properties. In particular, orbits can be unpredictably short and their length 
depends on the initial condition(s). 
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Another problem is that we know analytical solutions only for certain (boundary) 
values of the control parameters. This does not allow the use of parameters as a 
secret key; all the secrecy must be kept in the seed. 
7.3 Future Work 
As discussed above, chaotic dynamics, which essentially describes real (continuous) 
state systems, does not really contribute to digital cryptography. However, the 
following future directions can be suggested with respect to binary chaos: 
Structurally stable pseudo-chaotic systems It is very important to have a struc-
turally stable cryptosystem, i.e. a system that has (almost) the same cycle 
length and Lyapunov exponents for all initial conditions and control paramet-
ers. Most of the known pseudo-chaotic systems do not possess this quality. 
Increasing-precision pseudo-chaotic systems All approximations of chaos stud-
ied within this work are based on fixed precision computations. However, it 
is possible to increase the precision or resolution (e.g. the length of a binary 
state string) in each iteration. Furthermore, the precision can vary up and 
down according to a set of rules, defined to estimate the error impact. This 
technique would be very important in simulation sciences. 
Conditions of unpredictability for chaotic systems It is still an open ques-
tion as to what properties of a chaotic system guarantee its computational 
unpredictability. Known unpredictable systems have emerged from number 
theory problems. It is possibly that this is the only way to find unpredictable 
systems. 
Invertible pseudo-chaotic systems A one-way transformation forms the basis 
of a PRNG, whereas a key-dependent invertible transformation is the essence 
of a cipher or encryption scheme. Most chaos based ciphers extended their 
chaotic PRNG with invertible transformation (XOR, cyclic shifts and other 
permutations). The latter transformations can also be considered as pseudo-
chaotic maps. 
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Chaos based asymmetric encryption Modern cryptography is based on asym-
metric cryptographic systems, based on trapdoor junctions, i.e. functions that 
have the one-way property unless a secret parameter (trapdoor) is known. No 
counterpart of a trapdoor transformation is known in chaos theory. 
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